http://www.morganstanley.com/GEFdata/digests/20050307-mon.htmlFully 39 months since the last recession ended in November 2001 and the American job machine finally seems to be back in gear. Hiring gains are still not spectacular when judged against earlier cycles, but as underscored by the 262,000 gain in nonfarm business payrolls in February, they have certainly been on the upswing over the past year. Unfortunately, the quality of hiring remains decidedly subpar -- dominated by those toiling at the low end of the pay spectrum. Moreover, an even bigger hole remains in the US labor market: Despite generally sharp increases in productivity since 1995, there has been no discernible pick-up in real wages. The character of America’s recovery has shifted from jobless to wageless -- with profound implications for both the economy and financial markets.
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If that’s the case, there are profound implications for the macro climate. For starters, real wage stagnation keeps American consumers under considerable pressure. Over the first 38 months of this recovery, the wage and salary component of personal income has risen just 5% in real terms -- far below the 14% average gain over comparable periods of the previous five cycles. This dramatic shortfall of real labor income is an outgrowth of both subpar hiring and real wage stagnation. The recent pick-up in hiring is only of limited consequences if real wages don’t rise. It’s largely for that reason labor income has remained under pressure. Such an outcome leaves hard-pressed consumers with little choice other than to keep relying on asset-based spending strategies and going further into debt to fund such tactics. As a result, real wage stagnation is a recipe for persistently low income-based personal saving.
For financial markets, the impacts of real wage stagnation are equally profound. The good news is that real wage stagnation limits labor cost and inflationary pressures -- helping to boost profit margins and constrain any back-up in long-term US interest rates. The bad news is that the resulting shortfall of labor income keeps pressure on the US current account deficit as the principal means to compensate for a shortfall in domestic saving. That ups the ante of America’s imbalances -- putting downward pressure on the dollar and upward pressure on US real interest rates. Persistent real wage stagnation also puts pressure on the political arena, as hard-pressed workers are likely to demand increasingly protectionist “remedies” from their elected representatives; such an outcome would also put the dollar and real interest rates under pressure. My best guess is that prospective trends in long-term interest rates ultimately will be more influenced by the bearish considerations of the current account adjustment and trade frictions rather than by the bullish implications of well-contained inflation. From, time to time, however -- especially during periodic growth scares -- market sentiment could temporarily push bond yields to the downside.
For America, this recovery has been unlike anything ever experienced in the annals of the modern-day, post-World War II era. Record twin deficits and surging debt underscore the heightened vulnerabilities of a saving-short US economy. The need to normalize real interest rates raises warning flags for the immediate future. A new and exceedingly powerful strain of e-based globalization rewrites the sourcing equation as never before. Despite these extraordinary pressures, the hope all along has been that the sustenance of growth would shift away from the artificial support of policy stimulus and asset appreciation back to the organic support of labor income generation. But as the character of America’s recovery now morphs from jobless to wageless, the likelihood of such a “handover” looks exceedingly dubious. That raises serious questions about the hopes and dreams in financial markets of a benign rebalancing of the US and the US-centric global economy.