Black Box; SLO update -- get tomatoes ready!

[BevHarris]

(Suggest placing repetitive disruptors on ignore to avoid thread-locking)

This update doesn't include what we found out about remote access connectivity, which is the most important part, but it explains the E.T. call home thing.

A file was found on the Diebold FTP site containing a vote tally saved at 3:31 in the afternoon on election day in San Luis Obispo County, California.

I spoke with the Elections Registrar at some length, and so did Jim March. The answers from Diebold were, as usual, nonexistent, but the Elections Registrar, Julie Rodewald, willingly answered questions.

She provided a plausible explanation for one of the most serious problems identified, though the explanation reveals poor accounting practices and has not entirely checked out in a review of the database.

Some of her other answers didn't seem to make much sense, especially those regarding Internet and network connectivity, but we'll check those out further.

The most serious problem has not been addressed at all by anyone, and that is the security of the vote data during a live election.

============================================
The central points are:
1) Vote tallies were available for SLO County before the polling places closed
2) Security of the GEMS central count computer was breached when its midstream vote tabulation file was placed on an unprotected web site

- Understand that we've been promised that physical security is in place, limiting GEMS access to the county elections official, placing the machine in a locked room no one can enter, and making sure it is not hooked up to the Internet or to the county network.

- Those of you who have downloaded this file (http://www.talion.com/SLOprimary-ORIG.mdb) know how large it is, and how long it takes to upload/download to FTP! Somehow this large GEMS file from the midst of the SLO County primary election made its way from the "secure, inaccessible, locked-in-a-room, not-connected computer" onto the Diebold company web site.

- This appears to have happened on election day, since the file is tagged to "sophia" and Sophia is a Diebold employee who was present at the San Luis Obispo County elections office on election day.

- This pretty much blows up Diebold's defense to the Hopkins/Rice report, which claims that physical security and election procedures prevent access, so the software security flaws don't matter.

- SLO County Elections Registrar Julie Rodewald says that neither she nor any of her staff put that file on the Diebold web site, and she does not know how it got there.

========================

Now let's look at the plausible explanation for how the votes got into the file: Ms. Rodewald says that the votes in the SLO file as of 3:31 in the afternoon on primary election day, March 5 2002, were absentee votes, which were counted on March 1,2,3 and 4. She says they are not votes cast at the precincts, and therefore the machines in 57 precincts did not "call home" as we alleged.

I believe this will prove to be the case. If so, we've got new problems:

1) Why are absentee votes being marked "polling place votes?" (the explanation for this is inadequate)

2) Why are absentee vote tallies being compiled into GEMS before the polls close?

An unanswered discrepancy
- In the SLO database, absentee votes are tagged with "1" and votes cast at the polling place are tagged with "0."

- This means all of the votes, if they are absentee votes, should be marked with a "1." But the first 15,000 votes in the database are all tagged with "0" which appears to indicate they come from a polling place. However, scrolling quite a ways down the list are more votes, these marked with "1". It would appear that, therefore, some votes are absentee and some at the polling place, which would support our contention that machines called in.

- Enter strange accounting that gives me a headache: Julie Rodewald says that there are precincts which have both polling places and absentee voters, but there are also about a hundred precincts where people cannot go to any polling place, but can only mail in a ballot to vote. These precincts are called "mail ballot" precincts. Has anyone heard of this? I mean, this is California, not Outer Mongolia, but I suppose there is a good reason? Or maybe they just do this in a primary?

- Then, explains Rodewald, the mailed in ballots from the "mail ballot" precincts are called "polling place" ballots. (Correct accounting would call them either "mail ballots" or "absentee ballots" -- the one thing it would NOT call them is "polling place" ballots).

- Rodewald explained to me that you can tell the "mail ballot" precincts apart because they do NOT start with the letters CON.

- So therefore, the absentee votes marked "0" would be the "mail ballot" ones, right? Well no. She then explained to me that only the polling place precinct absentee ballots were counted, not the mail ballot precincts. Mystery of absentee ballots marked "0" remains unexplained, though I have a theory that they actually did include some "mail ballots" in their count. I'm checking on that now.

- Either "some" or "none" of the "mail ballots" were counted early but according to Rodewald, all of the absentee ballots were counted early.

- And were all of the absentee ballots that were in early counted early? Rodewald said they were, but I find a few dozen precincts that lack absentee ballot counts altogether. Hopefully, they didn't show up in a glob later...

Now this may sound like minutia, but in accounting, precision is correct and confusion is incorrect.

I'm reminded of this: NOV 2002 -- • Candidate declared victory prematurely: New Mexico candidate Heather Wilson declared herself the victor and made a speech, even though the margin was only 51:49 and votes weren’t fully counted. First reports explained that “thousands of new votes had been found but not counted.” Later, when thousands of new votes were not discovered after all, the reason for her victory premonition was changed to an influx of uncounted absentee votes, 2:1 for Wilson.

=========================
Here is a site where you can get ammunition: http://www.tomatoes.com/
Please feel free to throw them at me for my assumption that votes marked "0," (with "0" designated as "polling place votes") were votes cast at the polling place. Apparently they were not, they were mailed in and counted early, except that Rodewald denies that "mail ballots" were counted early. I find this to be a mostly plausible explanation (though a terrible way to do accounting).

For now, we'll take Rodewald's word that no machine at the polling place called in early.

Now, about security:

Let us examine what can happen if an absentee vote tally taken in the middle of election day is placed on the Diebold company web site.

1) Why should Diebold employees be privy to midstream election tabulations, when it is against the law? But first, is it against the law to tally the vote in the middle of the day before the polls close?

RESEARCH: Can someone find out if it is legal in California to get a vote tally before the polls close? We are not talking about an exit poll, we are talking about counting and tabulating votes cast before the polls have closed.

2) Why should Diebold allow anyone, with no login or username, to access live election files during the middle of the election? This file was placed on an unprotected web site that anyone could access.

3) Why should Diebold take any election vote file and keep it on a company web site?

And now we get to the really important stuff:

1) How did Diebold get access to this file, which can ONLY be created on the "supersecure" county GEMS computer?

2) Why did Diebold take a live election file during the middle of an election and put it on a file transfer site?

3) Who authorized this? Julie Rodewald, County Elections Registrar, says she did not.

4) What mechanism was used to get this file off the GEMS computer? A CD burner? A zip drive?

5) Who took the file from Rodewald's computer?

6) Who put it on the Diebold web site?

7) What was this file used for?

==================================

Thank you, and have a nice weekend.

Bev Harris

[Clete]

1. I sent an email to New Times our liberal county newspaper

in SLO County of your first post. I never received an acknowledgement, but I will forward this to them too. It can't hurt I guess.

[WilliamPitt]

2. This means nothing. Nothing. NOTHING!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Yaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaggg!!!

*ahem*

Sorry. Just trying to pre-empt the disruption, so the real goobers decide to stay in bed.

:)

[BevHarris]

3. Okay. Made me laugh. Oh, and about SLO media

(answering two replies in one) -- the SLO Tribune did call me for a fairly extensive interview. Her name is Stephanie -- can someone email this update to her? I didn't get her last name. Main email is [e-mail]

(I'm through my time budget on this stuff for today.)

Cheers.

Bev

[Clete]

4. I will Bev.

I'm surprised the Tribune picked it up. They are ultra-conservative although I emailed them anyway, just in case.

[Twenty3]

17. Tribune article

Security of SLO County's voting system called into question
Clerk-recorder denies March 2002 primary was compromised
Stephanie Finucane
The Tribune

The security of San Luis Obispo County's voting system was called into question Thursday when an author working on a book on the pitfalls of electronic voting revealed that she easily accessed early returns from the county's March 2002 primary off the Internet in January.

-snip-

Diebold representatives admit it was a "huge mistake" to have the data on a site that could be accessed by the public, but they adamantly deny the results were posted on election day.

-snip-

By law, counties are allowed to begin counting mail-in and absentee ballots prior to election day. But those results may not be posted before the polls close at 8 p.m.

"We don't release those results. In fact, we don't even print results. We don't know what the results are until 8 p.m.," Rodewald said.

The returns are stored in a central computer at the county.

"Only the deputy (registrar of voters) and myself have access to the computer on election day or any day," Rodewald said.

As the absentee and mail-in ballots are tabulated, the county periodically "backs up" that data onto a computer disc, in case the main computer were to crash. It was a back-up file that was posted to the Diebold said.

"I found it on Google ...," Harris said. "They not only left the door open, they hung up the welcome sign."

more
http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/sanluisobispotribune/6695542.htm

[Clete]

18. Great twenty3.

Thanks for the link.

[BevHarris]

33. Fantastic. And this article CONFIRMS the security breach

Thank you SO much for this. And here is another reporter who is unafraid to do her job very, very well. A balanced story but it is clear that this is a problem, and that Diebold either is not saying or HAS NO IDEA how it got there.

[Fredda Weinberg]

35. What breach?

A backup file turned up at a vendor's site. It's business as usual.

[Must_B_Free]

70. You're taking the wrong approach Fredda

You're supposed to make up your mind first, then look for facts that support your belief.

You seem to be wanting to look at the facts first and then draw a conclusion, which is obviously not how they want to run this thing.

You're doing it all wrong, which is why you are being attacked.

[DEMActivist]

74. Bwahahahahahahahaha!

Attacked? Tell me, how does one attack someone on ignore?

[Fredda Weinberg]

76. LOL!

Yes, I was realizing earlier tonight that my virtues were being seen as vices.

[Generic Other]

6. Do they actually use the acronym SLO?

Reminds me of the sign "Slow Children at Play."

Not so slow reporting their votes though.

[Clete]

7. Yes.

There are the jokes. So SLO county. :-)

[Athame]

73. Yes, and the signs on the "rapid" transit buses say

"You're following a SLO bus"

:silly:

[punpirate]

78. They can't be all bad, then...

... at least someone in the county has a sense of humor. *smile*

[Generic Other]

5. Former Pierce County auditor (Tacoma WA) Cathy Peasall-Stipik

Know her, Bev? She had recall petitions launched against her every election. One time, I recall she got in trouble for opening absentee ballots as they came in. Our whole county is mainly absentee. Her explanation was that it was a time saving measure. I seem to recall someone called her on it and she stopped doing it.

I sure would like to hear her take on this stuff. She was under fire so constantly in our county. They even put out one voter's pamphlet where every office had one candidate whose sole statement was part of a continuous tirade against her. She's a Democrat. And she closed every polling place in the county, made us do absentee ballots, and increased voter turnout.

Has anyone ever tried contacting her? I'd love to know some of the inside secrets she might have.

[Pobeka]

26. Well, she was under fire for a good reason.

She was constantly breaking election laws. And what really upsets me is that they have you fill out the absentee ballot in #2 PENCIL. That really seems like a setup for changing your vote after the fact. So I always marked my ballot with a felt tip marker first, then when back over it with the #2 pencil.

I wouldn't trust her as a source. Just my opinion of course. And no, I don't have any direct sources handy for the infractions she made, but heard it second-hand from people I trust a lot.

[AP]

8. I believe in CA, and many other states, you can either mail

your absentee ballot to the ROV, or you can walk it into the ROV on electioin day, or you can walk it into your precinct on election day.

Perhaps they note these votes differently in their systems.

I believe that if you mail your absentee ballot in early, they get sent to your precinct on election day, where they are tallied (probably at the end of the day, or maybe any time when it's slow, since they have to put them in the machines, no?). I don't know when they're added into the county vote if you walk them in to the ROV (rather than the precinct) on, or if they aren't received at ROV until election day. They must have to bring them down to the precinct (which I doubt) or, when the precincts bring their tallies into the ROV, they're added there.

Just guessing here (based on limited experience as a poll watcher in a state that isn't CA).

And I probably didn't tell you anything you didn't already know.

(I wish I knew this issue inside out...by the way, loved your interview yesterday.)

[BevHarris]

10. Hmmm -- actually, if that were the case they'd have a problem

Things we need to find out --

1) Is it legal to count absentee ballots early? That's a good point about Tacoma, getting in trouble for doing that.

2) What is the legal procedure for absentee ballot-counting in California?

3) What's the deal with mail ballot precincts?

4) Is it legal to keep a vote tally at all before polls close?

[Clete]

11. Last election, I was on phone duty.

They gave me a list of all registered Democrats in my area to call to remind them to vote. About half of the people I called had already voted by absentee ballot.

[SharonAnn]

13. I think mail ballot precincts are thinly populated areas where

it would be hard to locate a precinct that is in convenient driving distance for most residents. Therefore, they mailin to a precinct. This was a few years ago (maybe 20) so I'm sure things have changed somewhat in California.

[DEMActivist]

9. Get up there

[SharonAnn]

14. Sigh, How do i set disruptor on "Ignore"? I've never done it.

Thanks.

[punpirate]

15. Just click on the little...

... snooze icon on the person's post (the one with the zzzs). That's all there is to it.

Cheers.

[Fredda Weinberg]

12. No tomatoes

just another example of your flawed method. These reports should stay on your private forum until something is proven.

In this case, it's perfectly plausible that the single person to whom you spoke is unaware of the file's transfer. That does not rule out a likely scenario, which is that someone sent the intermediate file back to the developer to troubleshoot a problem.

[TheSickEmpire]

23. To Bev, DEMActivist, skinner, my mom and other posters:

I just to want thank you for posting this here today along with all the posts you make on DU. I like how so many people brainstorm in the DU threads. I want to be able to know that when I'm old enough to vote my vote will be a real vote, not an illusion. I won't trust any machine that isn't secure, or anyone who tries to stiffle other people's freedom to discuss any part of this issue.

I have a lot of respect for skinner because he made this site for us after the coup, and now we can exchange ideas and learn and make up our own minds on issues that interst us. I've been a DU member since the beginning of DU. I don't post very much cuz I read mostly, and then my mom and me have long talks about what we read (we do this every day!)

I appreciate when people have something constructive or funny to say. I don't think skinner likes it when people tell other members where, what, when, and how to post, cuz that's his responsibility alone, not mine (no matter how pissed off I get) or anyone elses.

Thank you, k

hi mom :hi:

[Fredda Weinberg]

31. You wouldn't want it done to you

Think about it for a moment: you're all grown up now, an elected official who got where she is by her own accomplishments.

One day, you start getting a series of rude phone calls, asking you for information. The press starts calling because they've gotten a release that says you've done something wrong - care to comment?

By the time your side of the story is even requested, you've had your name and contact information spread through a public forum. So while you're a public official, you've now been characterized as, at best, incompetent. Despite your reasonable explanations, the accuser remains suspicious and calls for continuing investigation.

Now, look at the alternative, which is how I worked: you keep information in private email, encrypted when necessary. You show preliminary drafts to those who can comment critically and always give the target a chance to respond before making the query public.

I can understand sympathizing with the goals of this exercise, but please accept that the methods are improper and damage those who are trying to accomplish constructive progress. I don't discuss my volunteer work, but I'm in contact with people who are very concerned what's going wrong at DU. The number of threads that have to be locked is only a symptom.

[aquart]

37. Asking a question of an elected or appointed official is improper?

That's what George and Dick say.

[Fredda Weinberg]

44. Improper to ask? No?

But please notice that the professionals - and even other committed activists you see - don't report speculative scenarios as potential crimes. There's a division of labor that's missing here, so asking is fine ... it's the public display that's disturbing. There's a private forum to exchange information and that's appropriate.

[TheSickEmpire]

39. that sounds like Fox vs President Clinton or

Fox vs Al Franken, and both withstood it all with grace under fire.

I'm just a kid, but the news does not report everything, or at least not fully or truthfully. I understand that the states are under a deadline with HAVA and the United States is under a deadline for a presidential election. Day in and day out I read here in DU about how the GOP and the media spins stories to suit their own purpose or the White House rewrites our history to make their spins make sense. They don't care who they hurt in the process, which in the end its the American public they are hurting the most. They throw stones and hide their hand. But now we have people on our side willing to throw a few stones and NOT hide their hand for the benefit of the American public, and I'm suppose to worry about a few public officials? I don't think so.

There is not enough time to playkate (sp?) If a BBV activist post something here there are a ton of responses of brainstorming, peppered with a few disrupting posts. If brainstorming and getting the word out that there is something horribly wrong while being stuck in the middle of a very short presidential deadline ends ruffling someone's public or private job thats the price they will have to pay to preserve democracy for my and future generations. This is about preserving our democracy with secure and accurate voting for crying out loud, not about someones job. One or a few can bounce back, our country may not have that opportunity.

This is the real deal. If the coup 2000 didn't happen, if 9-11 didn't happen, if we weren't in Iraq, if the Patriot Act I and II wasn't an issue, or if first ammendment zones weren't real, I might not feel the sense of urgency that gloves need to come off. But this is the real deal.

The only thing that can go wrong in DU is stiffling dissenting thoughts, ideas and endevors (sp?) The number of locked threads is a symptom of people reacting to people, (passion vs degradation) not due to the actual substance of BBV.

Thank you
k

[Fredda Weinberg]

45. People reacting to people?

I beg to differ.

You substitute questions for accusations, clearly labeled speculation for deceptive narratives - how many bogus press reports does this publicity stunt have to generate before you realize something wrong is happening here?

It does our cause no good to be associated with these wild charges - even if DUers cheer each, they're easily dismissed.

There is pending legislation to support, networks formed to exchange strategies - no one else is abusing this tactic of going public with every sham scandal.

[TheSickEmpire]

51. I repeat

"The only thing that can go wrong in DU is stiffling dissenting thoughts, ideas and endevors (sp?) The number of locked threads is a symptom of people reacting to people, (passion vs degradation) not due to the actual substance of BBV."

That is my response to you opening the door of locked thread symptoms.

Now, if you're working on this too then thats kool. I'm sure no one is or would disrupt you when you do it your way so why not let others do it their own way without disruption?

Thank you
k

good night

[Fredda Weinberg]

58. False charges are disruptive

I'm pointing out where the reports don't add up. That's not disruption.

[angka]

48. or tom delay yammering about how 'cultured' * is.

did i use this before? fuck it.



"You wouldn't want it done to you."

"I'm in contact with people who are very concerned what's going wrong at DU."

"It's the public display that's disturbing!"

seriously, is there anything in a democracy more deserving of an open, public process than an election? what possible defense can therefore be offered for secrecy and obfuscation here? what an absolutely despicable position to take.

goddamn right something's 'going wrong' at DU, but the question is for whom...

[Stephanie]

42. You love to drop names - what happened?

I'm in contact with people who are very concerned what's going wrong at DU.

Right. Who are they?

[punpirate]

43. Their names are...

... George Bush and Dick Cheney and Marc Racicot. They're going to fix DU's wagon, for sure... maybe with a little help from Lynne Cheney's friend....

[DEMActivist]

65. Hi KDER!

Good to see you around again! Wise, wise words from such a young mind. Nothing less than we have come to expect from you, though.

Tell Mom hi and give her a hug for me, huh?

[BeFree]

16. No tomatos

Just Red Roses and a long red carpet laid out for you, my dear.

I almost (almost) feel sorry that Rodewald has you barking at her door. She seems nice enough, but she is about to get a crash course in Diebold and BBV, isn't she? Whether she likes it or not.

Bless you Ms. Harris, and Thanks for all you do.

[Name removed]

19. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[Name removed]

21. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[Name removed]

20. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[never cry wolf]

22. Bwaahahahahaha n/t

[hunter]

24. Half Baked Ideas on DU

I often bring my half baked ideas to DU. Sometimes they are rejected, sometimes they are flamed to a crisp, and sometime they are cooked to perfection.

DU is an exploratory forum. These forums are a place to get your stories straight, not a place to release perfectly straight and polished stories.

No tomatos from me. Yes, I do think this story was delivered half-baked, but now it's beginning to smell pretty interesting...

[BevHarris]

27. Baking a story is impossible when

not a single party will answer questions. This is not a whine. This is a critique of a system which, by rights, is part of the public commons, but through greed and cronyism has been privatized into something where the key players are so arrogant they refuse to even answer questions.

A good example is certification: After two public records requests, we still can't get any document to prove the Diebold system used in Georgia was certified. Indeed, after these requests, we can't even find out what version was used! Then, for national ITA certification, we are told to go to the NASED document at The Election Center, but the numbers on that document don't match the versions that were used. At the bottom it has a disclaimer, something to the effect "this may or may not be right; if you want to find the real information, call The Election Center."

A call to The Election Center reveals that ONLY R. Doug Lewis can tell us what is actually certified, and a call to R. Doug Lewis results in (again) getting hung up on. Calls to the certification labs themselves get this answer: Call R. Doug Lewis.

The entire justification for using proprietary secret software revolves around two things: certification of the software, firmware and hardware, and the election procedures/physical security.

However, we CANNOT get our questions answered about certification (and neither could Dr. David Dill, according to his interview with Will Pitt and a conversation we had). And when we've asked "what election procedures/physical security protects the system" we typically do not get answers either.

Rodewald was unusual in that she offered answers. The first time I called, however, she was unavailable to take my call. Within 45 minutes of finally getting some answers, I posted same to the blackboxvoting.org web site.

However, though I believe her answers will eventually check out, even those were not entirely accurate, and some made no sense at all, particularly with the description of the now-you-have-it, now-you-don't Internet connectivity.

Yes, now we have some answers and the story is beginning to bake. The idea that we should discuss nothing until we know everything cannot fly when we ask legitimate questions and get no answers. I believe that if officials refuse to answer, and especially when they have a history of lying, as Diebold and some of the certification officials have demonstrated, we are justified in assuming the worst, and it is up to them to prove otherwise.

Our voting system belongs to US, not them; election officials work for US, not the vendors, and it is OUR MONEY that is buying these machines. We absolutely have a right to answers.

[Fredda Weinberg]

34. You don't know what makes sense technically

You don't understand Internet connectivity, or you wouldn't ask why the GEMS machine would produce content for a separate server.

Why don't you let Dr Dill and his group work on this serious issue? You're not the only one.

[punpirate]

36. Hopefully, to clarify "half-baked..."

... I go back to someone's earlier comment about the resources on DU being an example of "massively parallel browsing." *smile*

Not every supposition in a story is going to pan out, but using DU as a research tool is meant, precisely, to spread it out far and wide and let people look at it, comment, think about it, offer suggestions and encourage them to find additional facts.

That process can be interfered with by people with an agenda. Sometimes, that agenda translates to "don't look here, give up, you're wrong," etc.

That's fairly easily spotted. The more difficult agenda to determine is the one fronted by, "I'm an expert in my field, trust me, that doesn't work that way," but the comments are actually absent of any explanation how something can't work in that way.

But, for all, here's the simplest way to figure this out--it's not that someone sticks in their two cents' worth and goes on to another thread--it's when they're persistent and forceful in their objections to even investigating something.

Been through this a number of times doing investigation for a community group. When someone pops up, saying, "don't bother, it's not worth the time," you can bet it's worth the time.

And this thread, even if it only becomes one more instance of lousy security in the electronic voting field, is worth the time.

If Bob Woodward were still doing actual investigative journalism, he'd be on DU, asking questions, asking, "what do you know, and how do you know it?"

Cheers.

[Az]

25. The way in

If the wireless card in the diebold machine is in adhoc mode then the officials can be telling the truth when they claim there is no internet connection. Adhoc mode does not connect a system to the net. Instead it creates a node for a peer to peer wireless net. This would allow some with another wireless system in adhoc mode access to the system so they could manipulate files and download the GEM file at 11Mbps which is substantially faster than any net connection anyone here is likely to have.

[BevHarris]

28. However, that is not remotely the story I was told

Here is what I was told by Julie Rodewald when I interviewed her about the details of the Internet access:

She swears that the GEMS computer doesn't hook up to the Internet. She gave me a description of how it works, but -- ???

I told her I noticed that the results were posted on the web. She was quiet. I said "if you do a Google search for "GEMS" and "Election results" you get the same format, in counties all over the country, so obviously it comes out of GEMS. How does the GEMS report get on the Internet?"

Remember, she has insisted that her GEMS computer can't hook up to the Internet.

She said that they convert it to a .pdf and then take it to a server that uploads it. Well, I've seen the pdf versions of GEMS, and this is not a pdf. It is an HTML page. Also, in GEMS is a program called JResults which is a javascript program that converts the tallies to web pages.

Well we don't use that, she said.

I asked her what the reporters are following. She said JResults is used for that, but it hooks up through a separate network and they all come watch it on a projected screen and yes, that is JResults.

I asked her how the information gets from her GEMS computer to the network with JResults for the reporters. She gave this explanation:

She said they put up a second computer next to her GEMS computer and transfer the information from her GEMS computer to the other computer, which is hooked up to the network and goes out elsewhere, every half hour or so.

Let's examine human engineering on this. So, you have a system that, according to Diebold, and remember that "physical security" is one of their main defenses to the Hopkins/Rice report, the GEMS system is locked away in a secure office that no one can get into except the election supervisor and no one can touch that machine except the certified election supervisor.

So you have election night, with reporters milling around and petulant campaign managers asking irate questions and poll workers having little glitches and the phone ringing and in this environment:

The county supervisor remembers, every 30 minutes, to go into this private a physically secure GEMS room to remove a JResults file from her GEMS computer to a second computer sitting next to it. (JResults converts a RUNNING TALLY to web pages)

Next, you have a bunch of reporters sitting watching a screen, waiting for it to change every 30 minutes? Why do they sit and watch? Why not just get a printout every 30 minutes? Why not go out for coffee and do something else and just pop in every 30 minutes when the update is due? What are they "watching?"

It is my understanding that the function of JResults is to create a running total in HTML format that matches the constantly updated incoming results. And guess what the settings are for this in the SLO GEMS program: Update EVERY FIVE MINUTES.

I have a question for reporters: What do you watch in San Luis Obispo County?

[Az]

29. It still fits

Did she say they hook another computer into the diebold machine or just set it next to it? If its just setting next to it then it is an adhoc setup which means that any computer within 150 should be able to link into the computer and with the proper knowledge access any files they choose to. Adhoc is a specific mode wireless cards can be set to. Just as they claim it is not a internet connection. However it is a peer to peer network. It is a much faster link than you would expect on the net. The machine connecting to the the diebold machine could have any number of connections including a internet connection. If there is a wireless card in the diebold machine the security is compromised .... period.

[BevHarris]

30. Hmmm -- thanks for your thoughts on this.

I'm not sure whether they have a wireless card in the GEMS machine. There are setup and installation files for that which might prove informative, but I've been working on other areas. It's something to look into for sure.

Thanks.

Bev

[Fredda Weinberg]

32. The web server is a separate machine

while GEMS produces the output, it doesn't offer it to the public. All this is explained in the User's Manual - it's even got diagrams.

The web server can be connected to the GEMS machine via an intranet ... no public access - but dial in or VPN (virtual private network) capability with its own security. Or they can use sneakernet.

[Clete]

40. Oh, I guess no one explained that the user's manual

came from a higher power.

[hunter]

49. It's quite a show, isn't it?

Where's Toto? Maybe he could find the man behind the curtain...

The market for these Black Box Voting machines in China is going to be HUGE I tell you, HUGE!

Well, I mean once they get those damned prototypes in the United States working...

Maybe that's what they mean by "exporting democracy," eh?

:scared:

[BevHarris]

38. NOTE: BlackBoxVoting.org web site down briefly

It is already a large site, with active forums, both public and private, and a very large library and many articles and documents.

The whole kit and caboodle is being transferred to a more supportive host, so some of the pages will go offline for brief periods tonight, and if you post to the forum, your post may or may not be saved over to the new site.

The address will remain exactly the same, and the site will continue to grow more robust. Thanks so much for all your support!

Bev Harris

[shance]

41. More proof in the pudding why computers should not be used, or must

spit out a voter-verified, SEPARATE paper ballot.

Whew!

In a nutshell, this is truly hair-splitting, mind-numbing stuff and I am grateful to Bev and the rest for explaining it in laymans terms.

All of the energy, time and effort you guys have spent JUST to get some answers (that havent been received) is so much more complex and difficult than it needs to be, not to mention much more difficult to trace than a paper ballot. And we thought paper was bad?

Paper never looked soooo good!!

The sheer difficulty of obtaining easy, and tangible results is beyond ridiculous and appears a God-send to many at Diebold (and other companies)who are complicating the situation much more than it needs to be.

Once again thanks Bev.

[Fredda Weinberg]

46. Paper is not the solution

That only brings us back to the 2000 condition. There are solutions, but it means everyone working together - this shouldn't be a partisan issue.

[Clete]

47. It shouldn't be a partisan issue.

Which makes me wonder, why isn't the other 'partisan' concerned about this too? I vote in this county. We Democrats are in the minority here, so every vote counts for us. But it would seem the Republicans should be just as worried about this instead of trying to brush it under the rug.

If there is nothing to worry about then why all the secrecy? They should be more than happy to be open and transparent about this.

[shance]

50. Partisan Fredda? LOL!***

I am being partisan because I want to ensure that all votes are counted fairly? Now theres a new 'partisan' line I havent heard.

Why dont I use some better terms, like the words honest versus dishonest?

Oh and here are a few more....

How about words like MUCHO EASIER TO TRACK versus SO DIFFICULT WE WILL NEED A COMPUTER SCIENTIST AND CLONED MERLIN THE MAGICIANS AT EVERY VOTING BOOTH.

You really don't want to solve this, do you Fredda?

Almost everything you say is negative and accusatory towards any and all solutions, not to mention your consistent discounting of any and all facts presented.

If anyone is inducing partisanship it is you, by fighting and distracting everyone who is attempting to make our elections fair.

For the record, fair elections are not defined by parties, but by involved American citizens from both parties who value Democracy and the importance, value (lest I forget legitimacy**) of each individuals right to vote.

[Name removed]

52. Deleted message

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[Name removed]

53. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[Name removed]

54. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[Fredda Weinberg]

61. Almost everything I say here

is not everything I say or do. I've been involved in this issue a long time - so if you just started paying attention I can understand why you think my attitude toward this is negative.

Actually, I've seen excellent responses to my queries in Florida - from Republicans as well as Democrats. No, voting integrity is not a partisan issue, but it is more complicated than paper ballots.

[BevHarris]

55. Check this out:

From the San Luis Obispo Tribune (link is in a message upstream):

"Diebold representatives admit it was a "huge mistake" to have the data on a site that could be accessed by the public, but they adamantly deny the results were posted on election day. Diebold is trying to track down when the information was posted, she said. (Read: Diebold has no idea whether it was posted on election day or not)

"It was also not clear how and why the information was transferred to the Diebold site. While Diebold sometimes needs data for testing, no tests were run on election day, Rodewald said. An employee from Diebold was at the county Elections Office on the day of the primary to answer questions and help with any problems that might come up. "She's saying she did not post (the data) on election day," Rodewald said. "She said it's something she never would have done." "She" refers to Sophia Lee, who is a Diebold tech working with the programmers out of Vancouver, Canada. Sophia was on site on election day (but returned to Canada afterwards) and the password on the file is "sophia."

"Only the deputy (registrar of voters) and myself have access to the computer on election day or any day," Rodewald said. (You can experiment with downloading this whopper of a file yourself. See how long it takes! http://www.talion.com/SLOprimary-ORIG.mdb (or you can go to the Jim March download site, IT'S WORKING AGAIN! -- http://www.equalccw.com/dieboldtestnotes.html) -- now, decide for yourself: if only the registrar of voters and Julie Rodewald have access to the computer on ANY day, and they didn't take their file and put it on the unprotected Diebold web site, do we have a security problem or not?

May we have a show of hands?

Bev

[DEMActivist]

57. Hey, Bev...have you noticed???

Diebold hasn't issued a single press release since the day of my meeting in Georgia and David's visit to the RICO phone meeting between the voting machine vendors!!!!

Think they're running scared? I do!

I also think they've had a few "Oh, Boooooooob! days" don't you?

This SLO file must be giving someone heartburn, huh?

[Fredda Weinberg]

62. There's no whopper

Physical security is still security.

[punpirate]

66. Curiouser and curiouser....

"She's saying she did not post (the data) on election day," Rodewald said. "She said it's something she never would have done."

Didn't post it on election day. Didn't say she didn't have anything to do with posting it. Half the truth sometimes works, yeah.

"'She' refers to Sophia Lee, who is a Diebold tech working with the programmers out of Vancouver, Canada."

Uh, huh. Didn't know those guys were still programming for Diebold after the sale of Election Systems. Another indication that Diebold doesn't have a clue about the code they bought, but which they are nevertheless defending to the bitter end.

Gawd, I gotta start writing the screenplay and getting the cast together.... This could be the funniest movie of the election year....

Cheers.

[Must_B_Free]

56. Hate to have to mention, but this doesn't prove anything, unfortunately

"A file was found on the Diebold FTP site containing a vote tally saved at 3:31"

You don't know when this file is from, Bev. All you know is that you have a file with a suspicious timestamp on it.

I am doing system testing right now and, guess what? We changed the date on the system. Yep, that's right. Part of the testing involved a system date change. I have files sitting on the server right now that have a creation date in the future.

And in 2004, if someone looks at the date time stamp on those files, it will look like they were produced that year, but they weren't.

We need concrete evidence that has no holes in it.

[DEMActivist]

59. It's too bad you haven't read the previous threads

First, this IS a legitimate election file. How do we know? Let me list the ways:

1. The Elections Official in San Luis Obispo admitted it was their file.

2. The audit log included in the file shows it was opened, written to, saved and backed up ON election day.

3. The file contains REAL VOTES FROM ELECTION DAY.

4. Even Diebold admits it's a real election file.

It IS CONCRETE EVIDENCE. Every one involved, including the officials, ADMIT THAT.

[Must_B_Free]

64. Questions:

First, this IS a legitimate election file. How do we know? Let me list the ways:

1. The Elections Official in San Luis Obispo admitted it was their file.

So they are Ok with official eleciton materials being passed around like a cheap whore?


2. The audit log included in the file shows it was opened, written to, saved and backed up ON election day.


Again, do you know the system date at that time?


3. The file contains REAL VOTES FROM ELECTION DAY.


DO they have the voter IDs and and vote cast?


4. Even Diebold admits it's a real election file.

It IS CONCRETE EVIDENCE. Every one involved, including the officials, ADMIT THAT.


Then what have they said was their reason for getting results mid election?

[DEMActivist]

67. Answers....

All your answers are in the original post. Why don't you take a moment to read it?

[Must_B_Free]

71. You mean like this answer?

"I spoke with the Elections Registrar at some length, and so did Jim March. The answers from Diebold were, as usual, nonexistent,"

That's quite an interesting way to conclude that

"4. Even Diebold admits it's a real election file."

[DEMActivist]

77. No, THIS answer

As the absentee and mail-in ballots are tabulated, the county periodically "backs up" that data onto a computer disc, in case the main computer were to crash. It was a back-up file that was posted to the Diebold site.
http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/sanluisobispotribune/6695542.htm

[Must_B_Free]

60. And from a system testing perspective

The most accurate system testing would involve simulating a real world load, perhaps setting the clock to the expected execution time to verify no date time issues,

But, given 2000 is long gone, date time issues are not real hot ones right now.

I don't seriously doubt the veracity of the file, but Diebold will have this excuse as an out.

[DEMActivist]

63. Tell me...

do you have a problem with reading comprehension?

EVEN DIEBOLD ADMITS THIS IS A LEGITIMATE ELECTION FILE THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE HAD POSSESSION OF.

Maybe large print will help you, huh?

[ParanoidPat]

68. LOL!

:evilgrin:

:kick:

[Must_B_Free]

69. Oooh touchy touchy

OK. I'll just take everything you say as a fact from now on. I can see that asking legitimate questions is unwelcome here.

Sorry for asking, master. Honest, I'll never do it again. Please don't use the big font on me again master, please master!

[BevHarris]

72. Yep, the evidence of the date is as concrete as it gets

1) Date stamp on file. By the way, one does NOT (legitimately) change the date stamp on an election file

2) Audit log time and date stamps: The audit log on this file has over 1,000 events logged, going back to spring 2000. It has a whole series of detailed events logged for every single day leading up to the election, and then has a series of events logged on election day.

You bring up good points, but make assumptions about what information I have and don't have that are not valid. That file was saved on election day, and while I was interviewing Julie Rodewald, she brought her IT guy in, put me on speaker phone, crawled under a table to retrieve an old CD, and then located the saved file.

She and I sat and ran reports off of the file together, and our reports dovetailed exactly.

Even the elections officials admit the file is from election day. The only questions are when it was uploaded to the FTP, by whom, under whose authority, and why.

Thus, the file was indeed saved on election day, and since the password is "sophia" and Sophia was only there on election day, it is likely that sophia put the file on the web that day.

If the file was put on the web later, they would put the latest version of the file on, not the 3:31 in the afternoon partial tally.

[Must_B_Free]

75. Thanks for the informational answer

I'll wait for Dem_Activist to throw in the insults to finish it off.

I am looking at this from my perspective of 7 years in EDI. This stuf is alot like what I deal with - batch processing of large data Electronic Data Interchange files.

Having someone around to fix things that don't load is not uncommon in production usage. Whether or not this prson is doing anything unscrupulous is something we cannot tell easily, but it seems that unaudited access is allowed to the system. If one person can be their with access to the system what the hell integrity could it possibly have.

Reminds me of my favorite argument against technology:

My mom once needed a copy of a cancelled check that was at least 5 years old. They live in a tiny village and the bank is probably a 20 by 20 building, no high tech stuff.

She told them what she needed and the clerk whips out a *shoebox*, thumbs through, and pulls out the cancelled check from 5 years ago.

Some things technology just doesn't need to solve.

[BevHarris]

79. I think we actually agree...

Whether or not this prson is doing anything unscrupulous is something we cannot tell easily, but it seems that unaudited access is allowed to the system. If one person can be their with access to the system what the hell integrity could it possibly have.

That's the issue. According to the news article, apparently the Diebold employee says she would never do such a thing as put that file on the ftp site. Well, we really don't know, but here's how I get a perspective on these things:

- Julie Rodewald was clearly trying to be helpful. She might not know the security hazards she's dealing with -- I find the election officials to be quite naive about both computers and accounting principles -- but I think she was basically giving honest answers, don't you? (I mean, she crawled under a table to find the file, after all.)

- Diebold, on the other hand, has this track record with answers:

* That "file" on the web site was old and out of date
The facts: It was 40,000 files left on the site for six years and the last one was put on the site 12 days before my interview with Joe Richardson from Diebold.

* We have no evidence that any patches were done in Georgia
The facts: At least four sets of patches were done on 22,000 machines each, confirmed by two techs and the Georgia director of elections, and the patches were sent from Vancouver Canada placed on the Diebold unprotected FTP site

* Diebold version 1.0.0: The source code studied by the Hopkins/Rice scientists was never used in any election
* Diebold version 2.1: The source code studied by the Hopkins/Rice scientists was over a year old (not mentioned: The last general election was 10 months ago and it takes 8 months to certify the software)
* Diebold version 3.15.1: The source code studied by the Hopkins/Rice scientists was, after all, used in elections in four states
* Diebold version 4.5.21: The source code studied by the Hopkins/Rice scientists was mostly not used except some of it was
* Diebold version 5.6.13: That is, the source code was used, but it is not important because we have bulletproof physical security and election procedures that would prevent anyone from getting at a file
* Diebold version 6.1.00: I mean, that file was put on a web site and it was from our bulletproof physically secured GEMS server that wasn't connected to anything but we know for sure it wasn't on election day
* Diebold version 6.1.24: And also, we're going to check and find out when it was put on the web because we don't really know
* Diebold version 6.2.11: But our employee would never put a file on a web site even though she was there that day (and only that day) and her name is the password on the file

Who do you believe?

[JetJaguar]

80. Shoebox

I hope one day they don't open up a box
and just find a pair of clogs.

That would be sabotage.

Ba-Dump Bump, Rimshot.

That ones for the Pirate.