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... to civilians and there was some intelligence suggesting that Hussein was using that harm to blame the United States. When US troops were being massed in Kuwait, there was also some talk through Syrian back channels that Hussein wanted to negotiate an exit strategy for himself and his family.
With a little clever diplomacy, the United States could have convinced the UN to bring in a significant international peacekeeping force under the rubric of overseeing international aid distribution under "modified" sanctions (using this to leverage a deal with Hussein for his exit, with no protection guaranteed for him against international courts once he was out of the country).
Within two or three months, the local police could have been brought under the control of the peacekeeping force, an international tribunal could have been readied to assume control when Hussein took off, and when Hussein had disappeared, the UN could announce that it would be structuring elections immediately. Arms inspectors would continue to search for weapons and monitor Iraqi arms activities. International peacekeepers might have also been able to dismantle some of the intelligence agencies in a way that would have provided useful information.
Cities would be intact, few if any civilian lives would be lost, and if the Iraqi military attempted a coup as Hussein departed, military installations could be destroyed first, without harming civilian areas, and without the need for invading US and British troops.
The necessity for reconstruction would have been minimal, Hussein's status as a fugitive would have been no different than it was at the beginning of the invasion, and the police force would be under international control, so some measure of order might be maintained.
Most importantly, the Iraqi people wouldn't be blaming the Americans for throwing their country into chaos.
It would certainly have been preferable to try that first, rather than what Bush and the neo-cons were determined to do.
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