Chapter 3 from the commission report

[zaj]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence sources have been warning that the threat of terrorism is changing in two important ways. First, it is no longer just an overseas threat from foreign terrorists. People and places in the United States have joined the list of targets, and Americans have joined the ranks of terrorists. The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City are clear examples of the shift, as is the conviction of Ramzi Yousef for attempting to bomb twelve American airliners out of the sky over the Pacific Ocean. The second change is that in addition to well-known, established terrorist groups, it is becoming more common to find terrorists working alone or in ad-hoc groups, some of whom are not afraid to die in carrying out their designs.

Although the threat of terrorism is increasing, the danger of an individual becoming a victim of a terrorist attack -- let alone an aircraft bombing -- will doubtless remain very small. But terrorism isn't merely a matter of statistics. We fear a plane crash far more than we fear something like a car accident. One might survive a car accident, but there's no chance in a plane at 30,000 feet. This fear is one of the reasons that terrorists see airplanes as attractive targets. And, they know that airlines are often seen as national symbols.

When terrorists attack an American airliner, they are attacking the United States. They have so little respect for our values -- so little regard for human life or the principles of justice that are the foundation of American society -- that they would destroy innocent children and devoted mothers and fathers completely at random. This cannot be tolerated, or allowed to intimidate free societies. There must be a concerted national will to fight terrorism. There must be a willingness to apply sustained economic, political and commercial pressure on countries sponsoring terrorists. There must be an unwavering commitment to pursuing terrorists and bringing them to justice. There must be the resolve to punish those who would violate sanctions imposed against terrorist states.

Today's aviation security is based in part on the defenses erected in the 1970s against hijackers and on recommendations made by the Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, which was formed in the wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Improvements in aviation security have been complicated because government and industry often found themselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technology, and potential impacts on operations and passengers.

Americans should not have to choose between enhanced security and efficient and affordable air travel. Both goals are achievable if the federal government, airlines, airports, aviation employees, local law enforcement agencies, and passengers work together to achieve them. Accordingly, the Commission recommends a new partnership that will marshal resources more effectively, and focus all parties on achieving the ultimate goal: enhancing the security of air travel for Americans.

The Commission considered the question of whether or not the FAA is the appropriate government agency to have the primary responsibility for regulating aviation security. The Commission believes that, because of its extensive interactions with airlines and airports, the FAA is the appropriate agency, with the following qualifications: first, that the FAA must improve the way it carries out its mission; and second, that the roles of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in supporting the FAA must be more clearly defined and coordinated. The Commission's recommendations address those conditions.

The terrorist threat is changing and growing. Therefore, it is important to improve security not just against familiar threats, such as explosives in checked baggage, but also to explore means of assessing and countering emerging threats, such as the use of biological or chemical agents, or the use of missiles. While these do not present significant threats at present, it would be short-sighted not to plan for their possible use and take prudent steps to counter them.

The Commission believes that aviation security should be a system of systems, layered, integrated, and working together to produce the highest possible levels of protection. Each of the Commission's recommendations should be looked upon as a part of a whole, and not in isolation. It should be noted that a number of the Commission's recommendations outlined in the previous chapter, particularly those relating to certification and regulation, apply to the FAA's security programs, as well.

[classof56]

1. Thanks for posting, but I'm wondering, zaj, what your response to this is?

Guess I should read the previous chapter to see what those recommendations are that would apply to the FAA's security programs. I also wonder if the many militia groups throughout the country, whose avowed goals seem to focus on tearing down the government, are among the ad hoc terror groups referenced in the first paragraph. If Tim McVeigh was a part of that, I've always thought he should have left a detailed note enumerating his complaints and stayed in that truck when it blew up, instead of turning tail and running. Have to assume he wasn't one of those "willing to die for his cause", at least not until he'd availed himself of our criminal justice system.

Still trying to digest all of this, and thus interested in others' take on the report. Haven't had much time to read or listen today.

[zaj]

2. I would read the rest of the above report here... It's interesting.

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin~1.html

You might be a bit suprised.

[classof56]

3. I thought you were referring to the 911 Commission report

Nothing much surprises me anymore, but I've bookmarked the website you posted. Still wondering what your take on it is, in light of the 911 report.

[zaj]

4. That's kinda what I was going for...

I think it's interesting to read what Clinton did in the context that the 9/11 commissions are suggesting that Clinton and Bush treated the threat of terrorism equally and that both failed to treat the threat equally.

Clinton did more by tasking Gore with preparing this ONE report than Bush did before 9-11. But that wasn't it.

He also created the Hart-Rudman commission. Hart-Rudman completed their report in March 2001 and warned Bush about the serious threat of an impending terrorist attack on US soil.

Hell even the now-famous Sandy Berger told Condi Rice during her transition meeting, "You will spend more of your time on this guy, than anything else."

Richard Clarke came into the Bush administration pushing to implement the counter-terrorism plan he developed at the direction of Clinton.

Bush tasked Cheney with re-doing the report Richard Clarke presented when brought into office. Once 9/11 happened Bush eventually followed the recommendations of both Clarke and Hart-Ruddman, both of which were inintially developed under Clinton.

[classof56]

5. Okay, now I'm with ya!

Thanks for the succinct summary. So far, I'm not disappointed in the 911 Commission report, in great part because of the fact it "blames" Bush and Clinton equally, as you pointed out. There's more, of course. Again, I'm not surprised--just disappointed. Thought maybe we'd get somewhere this time. Hope springs eternal, and is eternally dashed.

Thanks again. Glad you're a DUer!

Bush Must Go!