In March 2003, Americans thrilled to televised scenes of U.S. forces moving into Iraq. Well-spoken soldiers, modern equipment, and embedded reporters suggested a sense of purpose, competence, and courage that resonated across the country. But today, 14 months later, the mission is in shambles, scarred by rising Iraqi popular discontent, continued attacks against U.S. forces, infiltration of foreign fighters, mounting civil strife, and no credible sense of direction.
Despite President George W. Bush's calls for staying the course, American public opinion has clearly turned against the mission. Some have already pronounced it a failure. Others, giving up on the idea of a unified Iraq, are seeking to salvage some measure of success by suggesting we break up the country, a proposal that would implicitly reward the Kurds--and invite more trouble later. Still others suggest that we reduce our ultimate objective from Iraqi democracy to Iraqi stability. All the critics warn that, if we don't change direction, we are headed for failure.
They're right: Absent significant changes, we are headed for failure. But the problem is not just that our goal of an American-style democracy is too ambitious; it's also that we've lacked the resources to meet it. Constructing a stable, representative government in Iraq is possible, provided we alter our strategy and tactics. To date, we have relied too heavily on our military to conduct tasks for which it is neither culturally prepared nor well-trained. While our troops should help secure the borders and handle internal threats that are too large for the still-nascent Iraqi forces, they should, as soon as possible, stop policing the country for one simple reason: They're not very good at it. Instead, we need to involve Middle Eastern countries and the larger international community in building a unified Iraq with a representative government that doesn't threaten its neighbors or serve as a magnet for Al Qaeda recruiting and that exerts enough control to ensure domestic stability and promote economic development.
First, the United States must correct the "dynamic of conflict" that it has injected into the region. In essence, the Bush administration has scared Iran and Syria into believing that, if the United States is successful in its occupation of Iraq, they will be the next targets. To the Iranians and Syrians, the implication is that their survival depends on dragging the U.S. mission in Iraq into failure. Furthermore, America's perceived pro-Israel bias, and its failure to engage seriously in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has fed the poisonous atmosphere fueling Arab anger toward the United States and its efforts in Iraq.
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http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040607&s=clark060704DTH
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