It's an auditing problem: 4 audits we need for Fall '04 elections

[BevHarris]

at Democracy for America (used to be Dean for America) http://www.democracyforamerica.com

Help do citizen audits in the fall elections: email [e-mail] with "volunteer" in the subject

It's an Auditing Problem

E-voting: Let's simplify. It's not a computer problem, it's an auditing problem.

Many people are frustrated by the e-voting issue. But we have been trying to debate an auditing problem by discussing computer programming issues.

Counting votes is just bookkeeping. When you frame the debate that way, most objections to voter verified paper ballots simply go away.

"Regardless of the accuracy of an e-voting machine, it is preposterous to have an unauditable system of collecting data. Think about it."
-- (Jim Hogue, Vermonters for Voting Integrity, and the author of Vermont T S.202 banning e-voting: it passed.)


Most people don't want to go through a learning curve to discover how voting computers work. Instead, we simply want to know: How can we make sure the machines get it right?

We can encrypt and test and certify until the cows come home, but a better solution is auditing. And what is auditing? It simply means that you compare one set of data against another to make sure they match. We can do many different kinds of audits, as long as we have physical records to enable them. Regular people can do audits. Your Aunt Martha can understand auditing. You can help audit elections, and you don't even need to be a public official to do it.

E-voting boils down to policy issues, not computer debates. Our democracy was never designed to be "of the programmers, by the programmers, and for the people." Democracy is supposed to be made up of everyone, including you and me.

Auditing isn't particularly expensive and need not be time consuming. Any election should, at a minimum, require four audits.

1) Compare the number of voters who sign into the poll book with the number of votes cast.

This is generally required by state law. But voting machine vendors are developing systems to abandon this audit in favor of electronic poll books using secret software. As citizens we must reject that idea and insist on retaining our physical poll books verified by human beings. The poll book audit has caught hundreds of e-voting discrepancies.

2) Compare polling place results with central tabulator results.

We vote in polling places. Then our votes are taken to the central tabulator computer which adds up the votes from each polling place. Polling place results must be made available to the public in a physical, permanent form before they are transmitted to central count, and they must match what shows up in the central count room. This will help catch vote alterations after they leave the polling place.

3) Compare voter-verified paper ballots with machine counts.

We must audit every election for errors, whether intentional or accidental. We call for an audit of at least 5% of the voting machines - hand-counting the machine-tallied ballots to ensure that the machines gave us the correct totals. If there are errors, the hand-counts need to be expanded. Note that we have been talking about "ballots" not "trails" throughout this essay. There is no legal definition for a "trail," but there is for a "ballot." Whether printed by a machine or filled out by hand, the verified paper ballot is the key to this audit.

4) Compare the number of absentee ballots received by the post office with the number counted by the elections division.

This audit would best be done by using Business Reply Mail, which gives a precise count for the number of pieces received at the post office. In any case, the post office should provide a certified receipt of the number of absentee ballots it receives, and this number must be compared with the number of absentee ballots counted.

None of the above audits are costly or time consuming.

By framing the problem as an auditing problem, you make the debate much easier to understand, solve real problems with election integrity, and put the people back into "We, the people."

[Andy_Stephenson]

1. Look at the comments Bev.

they want a ballot!

[goclark]

2. God Bless You Bev!

In the last few weeks, Democrats have been seeing a light at the end of the tunnel. It seems that TV and News reports are finally seeing that this War and this Unpresident were not wise choices.

However, ONE MAN/WOMAN = ONE VOTE will still be the measure of the election!

Thank you for keeping this issue front and center!

Please tell us more about how we can encourage our officials to have the AUDITS. What is our next step?

[BevHarris]

4. Next step is to join the Clean Voting Crew

Email [e-mail] with "volunteer" to do so. The Black Box Voting Clean Voting Crew will actually be doing audits based on the four steps above. We will also have a hotline to collect discrepancies, and a Plan B for when there are too many discrepancies to validate the election (remember: congressional races are very, very important -- not just the presidential race)

Too many discrepancies to validate the election: Think Florida.

[goclark]

8. I volunteered last month

I'll be working on the Clean Up Crew!

I ordered your book a few weeks ago. They said it would be delivered in a few days.

Can't wait to read it!!

[Gman]

3. This is a technicality, if anything

and I'm sure you're aware that the number of cast votes for each candidate doesn't always correspond to the number of signed in voters in an election. Usually the difference is maybe < .5%, or even less. Depends on if people choose to vote in a race or not. Of course there should never be more votes cast than voters signed in. A Laredo/Webb County situation in the March Primary is a sure red flag that there's fraud to be found, if you can find it.

--on edit... there's a lot to be said for proof reading before posting!

[BevHarris]

5. Yes, it won't exactly correspond

But a discrepancy of 144,000 votes (Boone County Indiana, Fall 2003 election, with just 5,000 voters signed in) would be significant.

Most of the proven touch-screen miscounts are caught with discrepancies. Also, in the May 18 primary in Arkansas, one place had more votes than voters.

Bev

[Cleita]

6. I've been saying this all along. Electronic voting should work

like a cash register in the supermarket. Once you do entries on both sides of the ledger, the invitation to cheat closes up. It's much harder to cheat when your vote is recorded in double entry columns. The total votes should be compared to the accrued votes for each candidate and each issue. When there is a discrepancy, then there should be a recount to find the error.

[BevHarris]

7. Yup. I liked your comment so much I put it in the book.

Chapter 12. To protect your privacy I gave your screen name a code name. It's on page 150.

Chapter 12, Black Box Voting: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/bbv_chapter-12.pdf

[RedEagle]

9. Back up

Create citizen advisory committees for everything voting and elections for your county. Get the council or whoever official mandate. Citizen involvement is the last thing they really want (won't say so but will try to block sometimes) and the first thing we must do- yesterday.

[stickdog]

10. Brilliant distillation of this critical issue, Bev!

Let's all keep hammering this point home.

[BevHarris]

11. Thanks. Due to a request, a batch of books went out today to

Russell Simmons' Hip Hop Summit Action Network, a voting / political arm of the hip hop community.

Yes, this issue can be simplified. It's still not too late. There are still legal actions pending; and in August and September there are a batch of primaries where the Clean Voting Crew can catch real, actionable errors by auditing and reporting them immediately to the hotline; we have a litigator hotline ready.

The biggest thing I've learned from tracking voting machine miscounts over the past 18 months is that we have too much lag time between the reports and the awareness, so by the time people hear about it the election has been certified, it's too late for litigation, and the press no longer cares.

We are going to continue to put the squeeze on this issue. And I've come to the conclusion that re-framing it away from computer security issues and into auditing issues will help.

[stickdog]

12. Kick.