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I'm currently reading this book, and it is certainly informative AND moving. I highly suggest that everyone read it, as it is far more important than anything out there right now by Clarke or Woodward IMHO. It provides the insider account and a window into transformation of beliefs of someone intimately familiar with the highest levels of government during the Cold War.
A couple of observations from the book:
Ellsberg talks at length of his experience working for John McNaughton, LBJ's Asst. Secretary of Defense for International Affairs. He says that prior to the escalation of Vietnam (circa 1964-65), that there were internal memos from WH staffers -- including Chief of Staff McGeorge Bundy -- that characterized the situation in Vietnam as ultimately unwinnable. He also says that Robert McNamara shared many of these concerns -- and that McNaughton was probably even more dubious of our involvement than Ellsberg himself was.
But, the whole sordid thing went down anyway -- because it was built on public deception and lies, and that all the players involved placed higher priority on loyalty to their boss(es) than to voicing their conscience. Ellsberg tells of one time, in a plane ride with McNamara, in which McNamara agrees with him that the situation in 1967 has not improved over the last year, and likely will not improve over the next year absent the committment of perhaps 500,000 troops -- and even THEN it's questionable. McNamara then exits the plane to a throng of reporters and tells the public that the situation there is improving every day.
Second, I cannot help but be moved by Ellsberg's account of listening to a speech by Randy Kehler of the WRL. Ellsberg literally broke down during the speech, ran to the bathroom, and sobbed uncontrollably for perhaps an hour. The one thing that ran through his mind over and over he said was, "We are literally eating our young." As an insider to the process, he had helped to perpetuate it despite his realizations that it was unwinnable. Following this moment, he came to the realization that he had to do something to try and stop it -- to simply remain involved in hopes of "preventing escalation" as he previously had done was a futile effort, and ultimately placed him in cooperation of what he came to see as a completely immoral and unjust conflict.
Thoughts from anyone who has read this, or how this applies to our current situation vis a vis Iraq?
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