I think we're focusing too much on the August PDB

[bain_sidhe]

Supposedly, Bush ASKED for this memo (if you believe Bush* instead of the FBI, who don't remember any such request). WHAT DID HE SEE BEFORE that memo that made him "ask" for it?

As I've pointed out in numerous threads, the CIA and FBI both produced far more specific briefings on threats in the months before that August memo (detailed here: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/091802hill.html ) What's interesting is that in the Congressional inquiry into 9/11 (held in Sept/Oct 2002) Tenant was happy to declassify the information contained in those briefings, but REFUSED to declassify any references to either Bush or anyone in the White House RECEIVING that information.

The August PDB might not be a smoking gun, exactly (although it clearly called for far more action than Bush took), but we need to know what he ALREADY knew before he GOT that briefing. The August PDB by itself is less important than its place in the context of information Bush ALREADY had.

IMHO, of course.

**edit :argh: to vs. too strikes again!**

[Brotherjohn]

1. I worry about that too. The press tends to say "It's no smoking gun".

That's the admin line they want you to take: Bush saying "We didn't have specific info about a specific time and place..." blah blah blah

But most in the press are seeing that for just how ridiculous it is. Although the PDB was the news of the day, they ARE asking further questions. Anyone with sense knows, as you point out, that the PDB of Aug. 6, 2001 was not the extent of the WH knowledge on terrorist threat. Richard Clarke alone has proven that. The only thing they can fall back on is "well, the president was never made aware" or "we had other priorities" blah blah blah

They basically are left with the incompetence defense. But that's just beginning to look more and more like bull the more people hear it.

[bain_sidhe]

3. Some of the things known by "senior gov't officials" BEFORE

August (and remember that we aren't ALLOWED to know who in the administration actually got the information, thus the use of generalized "senior officials" and "senior policy makers" terms):

*edited to bold all references to "senior gov't officials and suchlike**

The Joint Inquiry Staff therefore requested and reviewed reports the Intelligence Community had prior to September 11, 2001 suggesting that an attack within the United States was a possibility. Our review confirmed that, shortly after Usama Bin Ladin's May 1998 press conference, the Intelligence Community began to acquire intelligence information indicating that Bin Ladin's network intended to strike inside the United States. Many of these reports were disseminated throughout the Intelligence Community and to senior U.S. policy-makers.

...

Between late March and September 2OOl,the Intelligence Community detected numerous indicators of an impending terrorist attack, some of which pointed specifically to the United States as a possible target:

In March 2001, an intelligence source claimed a group of Bin Ladin operatives were planning to conduct an unspecified attack in the United States in April 2001. One of the operatives allegedly resided in the United States;

In April 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained information that unspecified terrorist operatives in California and New York State were planning a terrorist attack in those states for April;

Between May and July, the National Security Agency reported at least 33 communications indicating a possible, imminent terrorist attack. None of these reports provided any specific infonnation on where, when, or how an attack might occur, nor was it clear that any of the individuals involved in these intercepted communications had any first-hand knowledge of where, when, or how an attack might occur. If they did know, it was not evident in the intercepts. These reports were widely disseminated within the Intelligence Community;

In May 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained information that supporters of Usama Bin Ladin were reportedly planning to infiltrate the United States via Canada in order to carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives. This report mentioned an attack within the United States, though it did not say where in the U.S., or when, or how an attack might occur. In July 2001, this information was shared with the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Customs Service, and the State Department and was included in a closely held intelligence report for senior government officials in August 2001;

In May 2001, the Department of Defense acquired and shared with other elements of the Intelligence Community information indicating that seven individuals associated with Usama Bin Ladin departed various locations for Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States;
In June 2001, the DCI's CTC had information that key operatives in Usama Bin Ladin's organization were disappearing while others were preparing for martyrdom;

In July 2001, the DCI's CTC was aware of an individual who had recently been in Afghanistan who had reported, "Everyone is talking about an impending attack." The Intelligence Community was also aware that Bin Ladin had stepped up his propaganda efforts in the preceding months;

During the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community was also disseminating information through appropriate channels to senior U.S. Government officials about possible terrorist attacks. For example:

In June 2001, the Intelligence Community issued a terrorist threat advisory warning U.S. Government agencies that there was a high probability of an imminent terrorist attack against U.S. interests by Sunni extremists associated with Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization. The advisory mentioned the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and Italy as possible locations where an attack might occur. According to the advisory, the Intelligence Community continued to believe that "Sunni extremists associated with al-Qa'ida are most likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in numerous casualties";

Subsequently, intelligence information provided to senior U.S. Government leaders indicated that Usama Bin Ladin's organization expected near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences on governments or cause major casualties;

A briefing prepared for senior government officials at the beginning of July 2001 contained the following language, "Based on a review of all-source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning";

Later, intelligence information provided to senior government leaders indicated that Usama Bin Ladin's organization continued to expect imminent attacks on U.S. interests;

The Joint Inquiry Staff has been advised by a representative of the Intelligence Community that about a mouth later, in August 2001, a closely held intelligence report for senior goverment officials included information that Usama Bin Ladin had wanted to conduct attacks in the United States since 1997. The information included discussion of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam in December 1999 at the U.S.-Canadian border and the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It mentioned that members of al- Qa'ida, including some U.S. citizens, had resided in or traveled to the United States for years and that the group apparently maintained a support structure here. The report cited uncorroborated information obtained in 1998 (and previously disseminated) that Usama Bin Ladin wanted to hijack airplanes to gain the release of U.S.-held extremists; FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks and the number of Bin Ladin-related investigations underway; as well as information acquired in May 2001 that indicated a group of Bin Ladin supporters was planning attacks in the United States with explosives;

[Media_Lies_Daily]

2. There are 10 more pages in that PDB that we haven't seen...

...why not?

<http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/2002/diezeit100102.html>

Excerpt:

"Crawford, Aug. 6, 2001. U.S. president George W. Bush is on vacation. He wants to spend the whole month at his ranch in Texas. Every morning, however, he still receives his Presidential Daily Brief, or PDB, wherein the CIA informs the president about the country's security situation. On this morning, the report is straight from the CIA director. His PDB runs 11 and one-half printed pages, instead of the usual two to three, and carries the title, 'Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.' Therein the CIA chief explains that al Qaeda has decided to carry out attacks within the United States, and that presumably members of the terrorist organization have been in the country for some time. It is unclear whether the CIA director informed the president about the statements of arrested al Qaeda members. According to their confessions, the terrorist organization for some time has been thinking about hijacking planes and using them as missiles."

[bain_sidhe]

4. Does anybody know where this "11 1/2" comes from

The only reference I've seen is at the cooperative research site, and that's copied from a German newsweekly. I have to wonder if somebody expressed the concept "one to one and a half" in numbers as 1-1 1/2 and it got mistaken for 11 1/2 (eleven and a half). I'm not saying that's the case, I'm just saying that I've never seen anybody else refer to it as 11 1/2, and I wonder if it was a transcription error.

[Tactical Progressive]

5. Yes, the focus is too narrow on the August 06, 2001 PDB

Good link, thanks.