... and equality before the law vs. equality under the law.
As I probably said, I'm not an expert on US constitutional law, although I am certainly better-versed than the vast majority of people here. ;) I am quite expert in Canadian constitutional law, and aware of the differences.
In Canada, prior to the 1982 Constitution, individuals were guaranteed equality
before the law -- equal protection of the law. This meant that it made sense to argue that it was proper for First Nations women to lose their "Indian status" if they married non-Indian men, while First Nations men who married non-Indian women did not (in fact their wives gained status) -- as long as the law was
applied equally to all
First Nations women. They were equal
before the law, although not
under it.
Obviously, this argument amounts to straining at gnats and swallowing camels, as does your position (you refer -- "this" -- to the 15th amendment; it is actually the 14th re: equal protection, which I was of course referring to in addition to the 5th re: due process):
This applies to individuals, and says nothing about couples. Technically, gay people have the same rights as straight people in that each is given the right to marry a member of the opposite sex.You have defined the right in a particular way, one that is useful for the argument made. One might also define it as "the right to marry the person of one's choice" -- straight people just don't choose to marry people of the same sex now, do they? -- and that argument would fall. (That does not mean that there would be *no* justifiable limits on that right, simply that we can't each just define the right in such a way as to contain,
a priori, all the limits that we happen to think are good ones.) Gay men and lesbians are denied the right to marry the person of their choice, which straight people have.
Heavens, we could also say (as some have) that men are permitted to marry women but women are not permitted to marry women, and so women are denied a right that men have, and vice versa, and what we have is a distinction on the basis of sex, a generally disapproved form of discrimination.
The new Canadian constitution guarantees both equal protection and equal benefit, and both equality before and equality under the law.
I have a vague understanding of the concept of "substantive due process" as developed by US constitutional courts, under the US constitution, which guarantees only equal protection and not equal benefit.
From the first thing Google offered for that expression (underlining mine):
http://members.aol.com/abtrbng/sdp.htm"Substantive Due Process" is the fundamental constitutional legal theory upon which the Griswold/Roe/Casey privacy right is based. The doctrine of Substantive Due Process holds that the Due Process Clause not only requires "due process," that is, basic procedural rights, but that it also protects basic substantive rights. "Substantive" rights are those general rights that reserve to the individual the power to possess or to do certain things, despite the government’s desire to the contrary. These are rights like freedom of speech and religion. "Procedural" rights are special rights that, instead, dictate how the government can lawfully go about taking away a person’s freedom or property or life, when the law otherwise gives them the power to do so.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, states "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . " The facially clear meaning of this passage is that a state has to use sufficiently fair and just legal procedures whenever it is going to lawfully take away a persons life, freedom or possessions. Thus, before a man can be executed, imprisoned or fined for a crime, he must get a fair trial, based on legitimate evidence, with a jury, etc. These are procedural or "process" rights.
However, under "Substantive Due Process," the Supreme Court has developed a broader interpretation of the Clause, one that protects basic substantive rights, as well as the right to process. Substantive Due Process holds is that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee not only that appropriate and just procedures (or "processes") be used whenever the government is punishing a person or otherwise taking away a person’s life, freedom or property, but that these clauses also guarantee that a person’s life, freedom and property cannot be taken without appropriate governmental justification, regardless of the procedures used to do the taking. In a sense, it makes the "Due Process" clause a "Due Substance" clause as well.
Both the rest of this article and the "Judicial Scrutiny" site to which I believe I linked offer good concise explanations of this principle. "Substantive Due Process" is therefore, as I understand it, roughly equivalent to "equal benefit of the law"/"equality under the law" for our purposes -- discriminatory denial of rights or freedoms will require
justification. I do also understand that "liberty" may be understood in a more limited sense in the US than in Canada, but on the other hand I understand that the right to marry *has* been defined as "fundamental" by the US courts and one that may not be burdened without serious justification (e.g. by requiring that low-income people pay licence fees they cannot afford).
The problem with defining gay marriage as a mere civil rights issue is that doing so ignores the gender concerns that are obviously at the heart of the issue.Good heavens. Who wants to stand up now and say that the problem with defining the abolition of slavery as a "mere" civil rights issue is that doing so ignores the race concerns that are obviously at the heart of the issue? (By saying "a mere civil rights issue", I assume you mean "purely a civil rights issue".) Was the problem with defining votes for women as purely a civil rights question that doing so ignored the gender concerns that were obviously at the heart of the issue?
Are you not merely begging the question?
"Gender concerns", like "race concerns", ARE the question. The question is: WHY should those "concerns" be determinative of the constitutionality of rights violations? In what sense do those concerns JUSTIFY a denial of a fundamental right, and are they not a violation of substantive due process?
The question that should be asked is this: is it unconstitutional to define a legal contract in terms of a specific gender relationship?Marriage is not a legal contract, it is an "institution", within the meaning that is more commonly used and understood in the civil law (i.e. Continental-style
droit civil) than in common law these days. It is a "creature" in the system of law, a component of that system -- as is "contract". Oxford Concise, not of course a technical dictionary, says:
institution 3. an established law, custom or practice
]It is the thing composed of the laws, customs and practices regarding a subject, as expressed in the law -- the
framework within which certain relationships are formed and function.
The framework is not determined by the parties to the relationship. People who enter into contracts do not define "contract", or the nature of a contractual relationship in itself. Nor do people who enter into marriages. Parties to both relationships may define some specific terms of their relationship, but not the framework within which it is formed. Signing a piece of paper on which the terms of an agreement between two or more people are written down, defining their mutual obligations, is "signing a contract", regardless of what particular obligations they agree to. Ditto marriage: two people getting a licence and saying those vows before an authorized agent of the state constitutes "getting married", whether they like it or not. As well, the rest of the world is entitled to, and does, know the rules of the framework governing parties to an act within an institution -- like "contract" or "marriage" -- and what the parties' entitlements and liabilities as parties to it are.
So the actual question is whether it is permissible for the state to define an
institution, with all its public benefits and responsibilities and private benefits and responsibilities, as being available only to persons of a particular sex. (Or race, or age ... or not available to persons of certain degrees of blood relationship, or not available to persons in groups of more than two, etc.)
Could people of opposite races be prohibited from entering into contracts with each other? People of the same sex?
Are these "gender concerns" -- or "race concerns" --
relevant distinctions for the purpose of limiting who has access to the institution?
That there is the actual question that, it seems to me, you have begged by saying "defining gay marriage as a mere civil rights issue ... ignores the gender concerns that are obviously at the heart of the issue".
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