BBV: A crock from the ACLU is used by LWV against VVPB....

[althecat]

I found this statement on the League of Women Voters website.. it is a statement authored by the ACLU and is presumably being used by the LWV to justify there moronic position on VVPB.

Your mission (should you choose to accept it): Identify the most moronic statement in the morasse below and explain why it is moronic. Then I think we should let the ACLU know what we think...

It is mindblowing that the ACLU and LWV who are supposed to be defenders of voters rights are continuing to take this position in the face of so much evidence to the contrary.

It is particularly mindblowing in the face of an emerging consensus among political party organisations on this issue. On one side we have the public, computer scientists, political scientists, media and political parties... on the other we have (some) election officials, (some) disabled rights organisations the ACLU and the LWV!!!!

Go figure...

******

http://www.lwv.org/join/elections/hava_aclu_votingmachines.html

Help America Vote Act

ACLU Statement of Principles on Touch Screen (DRE)Voting Systems
The integrity of the voting process is fundamental to the operation of our democracy. A major component of a valid electoral process is voting technology that honestly and accurately counts every ballot. Because voting technologies have always been susceptible to error, bias, and corruption, we must remain vigilant about new technologies and insist that they maximize the likelihood of recording what each voter intends, regardless of the voter’s race, economic status, or geographical location. To this end, we must require that voting machines be accessible to all voters by reducing barriers to participation erected by language, physical disability, or complexity. Because democracy also requires that the public have confidence in the results of elections, we must ensure that voting technologies may not be rigged in a way that would thwart the true will of the electorate.

Though the now discredited punch-card voting systems failed all these tests, there is much debate about what voting systems should take their place. Touch screen voting systems offer tremendous potential advantages, including ease of use, accessibility to persons with disabilities, ready accommodation of the needs of language minorities, and the voter’s ability to review and correct ballots. However, computer security experts have raised serious concerns about whether those machines are open to undetectable error, tampering, or outright fraud. Moreover, recent experience with the use of touch screen voting machines in California and Florida illustrate that these machines are vulnerable to more prosaic problems such as getting the machines up and running, inadequate training of poll workers and others responsible for overseeing the use of the machines, and instances in which manufacturers have not lived up to their representations concerning the machines, e.g. the support for multiple languages.

The ACLU strongly supports the recommendation of computer experts that digital voting technologies be subjected to the most rigorous testing and certification procedures. This should include rigorous and public testing of the software used in these systems.

The Voter-Verified Paper Ballot

Some computer experts have recommended the inclusion of a contemporaneously created, “voter-verified” paper ballot that would become the ballot of record in the case of a disputed election. The ACLU has serious reservations about the both the effectiveness and practicality of this proposal for the following reasons:

Election officials would resort to a “verified paper trail” only in the case a recount or contest, which a hacker can prevent or deter. In most jurisdictions, recounts are triggered only when an election is close. Thus, anyone savvy enough to hack into a digital system and alter election results would simply select a margin of victory big enough to prevent a recount or discourage a contest. In these jurisdictions, a competent hacker could block the review of any paper ballots. Even in those few jurisdictions, like California, which automatically conduct a recount of a small percentage of the ballots, a sophisticated fraud could thwart detection by corrupting the code for the paper printout. (See paragraph 2 below)

The voter-verified paper trail could be used by a sophisticated fraud to give voters a false sense of security that their vote was correctly tallied. For example, if the computer code is genuinely vulnerable to attack, a competent hacker could not only compromise it to make the machine record a fraudulent vote, but could also compromise the code that runs the printer, causing it to display the voter’s intent while the machine records the fraud.

There is no reason to assume that paper recounts are more accurate than DRE machine tabulations. Paper is notoriously difficult to handle and easy to manipulate. Counting the paper ballots generated by DREs would be subject to all of the historical problems associated with paper ballots, including human error, fraud, and mishandling.

The reliability of printers has never been systematically tested in conditions similar to those that exist in polling places on Election Day.

Recommendations

The ACLU believes that the voter verified paper ballots should be not be employed until there has been a rigorous test of their reliability and practicality in circumstances comparable to their use on Election Day. This review should include a consideration of the possibility for human error and fraud in handling these ballots.

In the interim, if DRE’s are to be employed in the 2004 election cycle:

The computer source code for all security critical functions of the machines should be subjected to thorough independent review. “Open Source Code”, which can be freely tested, is the best solution to the problem of computer software integrity. At a minimum, the full the code should be subjected to a review by an independent body and only open source code should be used for tabulating the results.

Rigorous physical security measures need to be instituted to insure that the machines and any associated paper ballots are not compromised.

Election officials need to be thoroughly trained in their use and the physical infrastructure necessary to insure their use, e.g. sufficient electrical wiring, needs to be assured.

The jurisdiction should have a permanent broad-based security task force or oversight body, representing all interested segments of the community, to evaluate the potential for fraud or error in voting systems and to address the new security challenges that will inevitably arise in the future. That task force should have complete access to the DRE code and conduct its own independent testing.

Election officials should select technology that gives them maximum flexibility in taking advantage of emerging technological innovations, including the incorporation of printer that will provide a voter-verified paper ballot for use with touch screen systems, if such technological innovations are shown to be feasible and to enhance the integrity of the voting process.
If an election jurisdiction chooses to employ optical scan or a method other than DREs for its general balloting, it should:

Be required to have a sufficient number of DREs available to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities and,

Employ systems that can accommodate the needs of language minorities.

Finally, the ACLU believes that the debate over the voter verified paper ballot has obscured other important issues that bear greater scrutiny. We believe there needs to be:

An evaluation of the new generation of touch screen machines only now being developed and, in some cases, used in nations such as Brazil and Australia, and those being developed in the US by non-partisan and non-profit institutions. The review should especially focus on those systems, e.g., the Australian system, which are based on open source code.

Thorough and independent studies of the error rates including “lost ballots” that fail to record, as well as over and under votes, of the two newer voting technologies most likely to be employed in 2004 election-- touch screen and optical scan ballots.

An analysis of existing testing and certification procedures for all digitally-based voting technologies, including both touch screen and optical scan voting technologies, to determine whether current procedures assure the integrity and security of all hardware, software, and any associated paper ballots.

[gristy]

1. OMFG, the LWV is clearly an accomplice in this fraud

Election officials would resort to a "verified paper trail" only in the case a recount or contest, which a hacker can prevent or deter. In most jurisdictions, recounts are triggered only when an election is close. Thus, anyone savvy enough to hack into a digital system and alter election results would simply select a margin of victory big enough to prevent a recount or discourage a contest. In these jurisdictions, a competent hacker could block the review of any paper ballots. Even in those few jurisdictions, like California, which automatically conduct a recount of a small percentage of the ballots, a sophisticated fraud could thwart detection by corrupting the code for the paper printout. (See paragraph 2 below)

They completely ignore the random recounts called for in HR2239 or the Senate companion bill. Straw men, nothing but straw men.

Is ANYONE here a member of LWV?

The ACLU believes that the voter verified paper ballots should be not be employed until there has been a rigorous test of their reliability and practicality in circumstances comparable to their use on Election Day. This review should include a consideration of the possibility for human error and fraud in handling these ballots.

In the interim, if DRE?s are to be employed in the 2004 election cycle:

So DREs are a friggin INTERIM SOLUTION to voter-verified paper ballots!! That's a new one.

Election officials need to be thoroughly trained in their use and the physical infrastructure necessary to insure their use, e.g. sufficient electrical wiring, needs to be assured.

I am so glad they are putting their concern where it is most needed: making sure the polling site doesn't blow a fuse and/or burn down!

The jurisdiction should have a permanent broad-based security task force or oversight body, representing all interested segments of the community, to evaluate the potential for fraud or error in voting systems and to address the new security challenges that will inevitably arise in the future. That task force should have complete access to the DRE code and conduct its own independent testing.

And who is going to test "the task force"????

If an election jurisdiction chooses to employ optical scan or a method other than DREs for its general balloting, it should:

Be required to have a sufficient number of DREs available to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities and

This is a red herring. Why should you care if the disabled's vote is recorded without a paper ballot (that's a definition of DRE, you know, moron)? Shouldn't you simply be concerned that the disabled are able to vote in private? Shouldn't that be your bottom line? Why the f*** isn't it?

This is a pathetic little position statement. I believe they WILL face a backlash, given the increased press on BVV and the simple thought process required (though LWV has not yet seemed to master it) required to understand that BBV with no hardcopy record is like not voting at all.

The LWV and many Sec'y of States complain about how friggin DIFFICULT it is to manage all that paper. GET OVER IT. Do your job. You're not the only ones with difficult jobs. But not many of us have jobs as important as yours. Do your friggin job.

[Stephanie]

2. LWV is to Voters

as AARP is to Retired People.

SELL-OUTS. No longer RELEVANT.

[gristy]

3. I sent in my letter

Your position paper http://www.lwv.org/join/elections/hava_aclu_votingmachines.html
is horrible. Computer scientists, non-partisan observers, political parties, the media, countless editorial pages, and most importantly, VOTERS all now recognize the importance of a secure paper record in keeping the recording and counting of our vote fraud-free. You would have our vote counted by private corporations in a back room. There is NO WAY to NOT do that with DREs. Your criticisms of paper ballots are beyond the pale. Poorly layed out, generally invalid, and full of straw men and red herring. Nobody ever said counting votes was supposed to be easy. And certainly no one ever said that it had to be "fast" or "safe". What we want is it to be accurate and secure. Is the tower you live in ivory? It sure seems that way from down here. Please reconsider your position. I am well-informed on this issue and am available at your service should you have any questions.