The Dilemma of Dissent (Newsweek Essay)

[dtotire]

You try to make the best of an executive decision you think is wrong. But there's a limit. A former Bush aide looks back.
By Richard N. Haass | NEWSWEEK


In early July 2002 I went to see Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush's National Security Advisor, in her West Wing office. I was meeting Condi in my capacity as director of policy planning, the State Department's internal think tank. But we were longtime friends, dating back to our work together for the first President Bush more than a decade before, andThe Dilemma of Dissent

You try to make the best of an executive decision you think is wrong. But there's a limit. A former Bush aide looks back.
By Richard N. Haass | NEWSWEEK our get-togethers were not part of any formal interagency process.

As usual, I prepared on a yellow pad a list of the half-dozen or so issues I wanted to discuss during what normally was a 30- or 45-minute meeting. At the top of my list was Iraq. For several weeks, those on my staff who dealt with Iraq and other Middle East issues had been reporting back that they sensed a shift in tone within the government. Their counterparts working at the Pentagon, the National Security Council (NSC) and the vice president's office who favored going to war with Iraq were sending signals that things were going their way. I did not share this enthusiasm for going to war, believing that we had other viable options and fearing that any conflict would be much tougher than the advocates predicted. I was also concerned that an invasion would take an enormous toll on the rest of American foreign policy at the precise moment in history that the United States enjoyed a rare opportunity to exert extraordinary influence.

I began my meeting with Condi by noting that the administration seemed to be building momentum toward going to war with Iraq and that I harbored serious doubts about doing so. I reminded her that I knew something about this issue given my role in the previous Bush administration, where I had served as the president's senior Middle East advisor on the NSC staff. And I asked her directly, "Are you really sure you want to make Iraq the centerpiece of the administration's foreign policy?"

more:
http://www.newsweek.com/id/195667

[Captain Hilts]

1. 'the Pentagon' did NOT want to invade Iraq. GWB's Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon did.

Rumsfeld and the 'intelligence' office especially created to market the war did.

The Army did not.
The Marines did not.
The Navy did not.
The Air Force - Gen. Meyers - probably did.

[Recursion]

2. Command did, G3 and G2 didn't

The complaint is usually presented as politicians not listening to generals, but the real issue here IMO was generals not listening to their staff.

[Captain Hilts]

3. Some generals yes, others no.

Think about it - the three people who really pushed the invasion aside from Cheney, were President Bush, Sec. Rumsfeld and General Myers - ALL aviators who never got their nails dirty.

[zipplewrath]

4. Yup

More than one general has admitted that, once again as in Vietnam, Generals didn't have the stomache to stand up and say, "This is wrong and won't work". They let their men go into these meat grinders instead of confronting power. It will never change.