The first official army history of the Iraq war reveals that United States forces were plagued by supply shortages, radios that could not reach far-flung troops and virtually no reliable intelligence on how Saddam Hussein would defend Baghdad.
While it is well known that many army units ran low on fuel and water as fast-moving armoured forces raced towards the Iraqi capital, the study offers vivid new details of a supply system nearing collapse.
Tank engines sat on warehouse shelves in Kuwait with no truck drivers to carry them north. Broken-down trucks were scavenged for usable parts and left by the roadside. Artillery units cannibalised parts from captured Iraqi guns to keep their howitzers operating.
In most cases, soldiers improvised solutions to keep the offensive rolling.
"The morass of problems that confounded delivering parts and supplies - running the gamut of paper clips to tank engines - stems from the lack of a means to assign responsibility clearly," the report concluded.
The unclassified study was ordered last year by the former army chief-of-staff General Eric Shinseki, who clashed with the Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, over troop strength for postwar Iraq. It draws on interviews with 2300 people, 68,000 photographs and nearly 120,000 documents.
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http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/02/03/1075776064461.html