Weapons of Mass Delusion
WMDs: Flawed Intelligence Flawed Interpretation
http://www.newsday.com/news/opinion/ny-cov3650781feb01,0,5081762.story?coll=ny-editorials-headlinesFebruary 1, 2004
David Kay, former head of the U.S. team searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, is a bit like the legendary boy who dared say the emperor had no clothes. When Kay resigned, he finally stated the obvious: Iraq had no stockpiles of such weapons, the key White House justification for going to war.
Kay had gone looking for biological and chemical weapons and nuclear bomb programs, fully convinced they existed. He was in good company. Every intelligence agency in the Western world - regardless of how its government viewed the legitimacy of the war in Iraq - believed the same thing. So did former President Bill Clinton's national security team. So did United Nations weapons inspectors and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
Sweep aside for a moment the political backbiting, the self-justifications and the partisan finger-pointing swirling around the probability that Iraq ceased to possess WMD stockpiles or even significant programs to manufacture them since at least the mid-1990s. The stark reality is that their existence was accepted as incontrovertible by this nation's foreign-policy establishment, from intelligence analysts to national security advisers to top policy-makers to, finally, two presidents, one of whom - George W. Bush - went to war over them.
How did everyone get it so wrong, and what can be done to make sure such an intelligence debacle doesn't happen again? The answers aren't simple. It may take an independent investigation to sort it all out. It may not be possible: To avoid overestimating one risk may result in underestimating the next one.
Mutual Self-Delusion
And it's crucial to distinguish between failures of the intelligence community and the outright distortions and exaggerations by White House policy-makers. They made a bad situation worse. But on the question of the intelligence product itself, not what policy-makers did with the intelligence, it appears that players on both sides of Iraq's fence were caught in a deadly game of mutual self-delusion.