At the heart of the process is a mysterious lack of logic. On the one hand Hutton spent weeks listening to evidence about the preparation of the Government's case against Saddam in the September dossier, but when it came to writing his report he rejected the need to address the issue of the dossier's truth. 'A question of such wide import ... is not one which falls within my terms of reference.'
Two points need to be made:- If he was not going to rule on this, why go into the facts at such length?
- The truth of the dossier's contents is the essence of the circumstances of Kelly's death because that issue propelled the BBC and Campbell to escalate their running battle to open war. Owning the truth was what that was all about.
I'm not entirely sure I agree with the second point. The purpose of the Hutton inquiry was to determine who did what to Dr. Kelly and why. That is a separate matter from the actual truth of the dossier. The first question is still a good.
We know the dossier was full of crap. The question is whether this crap was put there by Number 10 in order to make a strong case for invading Iraq that did not jive with the facts at hand or whether MI6 just got it all wrong.
It is a parallel situation to what is happening here. Dr. Kay's testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee and his remarks to the press are not so dramatic as Lord Hutton's inquiry, but they are being used for the same purpose: clear the war planners and blame the intelligence agencies.
Never mind the
findings of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:
The dramatic shift between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), together with the creation of an independent intelligence entity at the Pentagon and other steps, suggest that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers’ views sometime in 2002.
-- WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), p.50
Never mind the
mission of the Office of Special Plans:
They call themselves, self-mockingly, the Cabal—a small cluster of policy advisers and analysts now based in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans. In the past year, according to former and present Bush Administration officials, their operation, which was conceived by Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, has brought about a crucial change of direction in the American intelligence community. These advisers and analysts, who began their work in the days after September 11, 2001, have produced a skein of intelligence reviews that have helped to shape public opinion and American policy toward Iraq. They relied on data gathered by other intelligence agencies and also on information provided by the Iraqi National Congress, or I.N.C., the exile group headed by Ahmad Chalabi. By last fall, the operation rivalled both the C.I.A. and the Pentagon’s own Defense Intelligence Agency, the D.I.A., as President Bush’s main source of intelligence regarding Iraq’s possible possession of weapons of mass destruction and connection with Al Qaeda. As of last week, no such weapons had been found. And although many people, within the Administration and outside it, profess confidence that something will turn up, the integrity of much of that intelligence is now in question.
-- Seymour Hersh, "Selective Intelligence", The New Yorker, May 12, 2003
Never mind that the junta's case for war was unraveling even before the invasion. There were good reasons to doubt Saddam's military capabilities long before the March 2003.
Scott Ritter was telling the world that Saddam's arsenal had been almost completely eliminated by the end of 1998; in the wake of General Powell's testimony to the UN, a British expert released the
Hussain Kamel interview with UNSCOM in which General Kamel stated that he had ordered Iraq's chemical weapons destroyed. We knew that the stories about a meeting between a September 11 terrorist and an Iraqi intelligence agent were
false. Add to that the
questionable nature of what Blair presented in his dossier. Plagerizing from a postgraduate thesis seems unworthy for the leader of the British nation.
In short, before March 2003, the information was available, much of it in public, to credibly challenge the case for war as presented by Bush, Blair and their aides. They were lying and they knew they were lying. There was no case for war and they knew there was no case for war.
The intelligence was not wrong. It was cooked.