Bernard-henri Levy: Curious timing on the arrests by Pakistan

[housewolf]

Bernard-henri Levy: Curious timing on the arrests by Pakistan
Bernard-henri Levy
Published May 18, 2005

Let's recap: The Pakistani special forces squad arrested Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaida's third in command, on March 1, 2003, a few hours before informing the Americans that Pakistan would not back a resolution in favor of the war in Iraq. They arrested Yasser Jazeeri, another key Al-Qaida operative, in March 2003, a few months before Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf visited Camp David, where he was promised foreign aid to the unprecedented tune of $3 billion.

In March 2002, they collared Abu Zubeida, Al-Qaida operations chief, and they did this during a big U.S. congressional debate on the question of foreign aid to Pakistan, as well as on delivering the F-16 fighter jets that had been held back by the Pentagon because of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. (The delivery of the jets was even more hotly debated because it was at the top of the list of demands made by Daniel Pearl's kidnappers.) Months later, on Sept. 11, the Pakistanis chose the first anniversary of the destruction of the twin towers in Manhattan to announce the arrest of Ramzi Binalshib -- one of the conceivers and coordinators of the 9/11 attacks -- in a residential neighborhood in Karachi where he had been living almost openly.

<snip>

In each case, we can find a reason for this series of coincidences between the lightning-raid operations of the Pakistani armed forces and the political needs of the U.S. president. Still, I can't get it out of my mind that we have, even more than coincidences, a recurrence, or a law, or even something that looks a lot like a test of strength between the two countries.

<snip>

It is as if the Pakistani powers that be have had, ever since Al-Qaida's retreat from Afghanistan and their withdrawal into Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi, a precise idea of where the chiefs of Al-Qaida could be found. It is as if Pakistan's formidable intelligence service, the ISI, had not only localized but kept these public enemies of the United States -- and theoretically of Pakistan -- under observation, handy for periodic culling. It is as if these people were bargaining chips, with the Pakistanis drawing from their reserves of terrorists and cashing them in one by one, depending on the needs of their relationship with the great American "friend."

<ship>


Fascinating...
http://www.startribune.com/dynamic/story.php?template=print_a&story=5409058

[punpirate]

1. This should not be...

... news in any real sense of the word. After all, the US made trading for arms official policy in the 1980s--it seemed for a substantial part of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran could count on Reagan's people sending another load of weapons or spare parts in exchange for their help interceding with terrorist organizations who'd captured Americans and held them hostage.

The failure of the US to delineate the involvement of the ISI in payments to terrorists in this country should have told everyone what the operative relationship of Pakistan and the US would be in the future.