http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/03/international/middleeast/03tube.html?hp Skewed Intelligence Data in March to War in Iraq
By DAVID BARSTOW, WILLIAM J. BROAD
and JEFF GERTH
Published: October 3, 2004
This article was reported by David Barstow, William J. Broad and Jeff Gerth, and was written by Mr. Barstow.
In 2002, at a crucial juncture on the path to war, senior members of the Bush administration gave a series of speeches and interviews in which they asserted that Saddam Hussein was rebuilding his nuclear weapons program. In a speech to veterans that August, Vice President Dick Cheney said Mr. Hussein could have an atomic bomb "fairly soon." President Bush, addressing the United Nations the next month, said there was "little doubt" about Mr. Hussein's appetite for nuclear arms.
The United States intelligence community had not yet concluded that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear weapons program. But as the vice president told a group of Wyoming Republicans that September, the United States had "irrefutable evidence" - thousands of tubes made of high-strength aluminum, tubes that the Bush administration said were destined for clandestine Iraqi uranium centrifuges, before some were seized at the behest of the United States.....
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The next night, during his State of the Union address, President Bush cited I.A.E.A. findings from years past that confirmed that Mr. Hussein had had an "advanced'' nuclear weapons program in the 1990's. He did not mention the agency's finding from the day before.
He did, though, repeat the claim that Mr. Hussein was trying to buy tubes "suitable for nuclear weapons production.'' Mr. Bush also cited British intelligence that Mr. Hussein had recently sought "significant quantities'' of uranium from Africa - a reference in 16 words that the White House later said should have been stricken, though the British government now insists the information was credible.
"Saddam Hussein,'' Mr. Bush said that night, "has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide. The dictator of Iraq is not disarming.''
A senior administration official involved in vetting the address said Mr. Bush did not cite the I.A.E.A. conclusion of Jan. 27 because the White House believed the agency was analyzing old Iraqi tubes, not the newer ones seized in Jordan. But a senior official at the agency and a senior American intelligence official each said the international group's analysis covered both types of tubes....
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It's a long article - 16 pages. Seems to support the notion that the administration knew that the infomation presented in the SOTU address and to the UN was not credible.