We also learn from an
Australian news source that the British Foreign Office is now doubting that Saddam's biochemical arsenal exists. The official line from the government, however, remains "We stand by the September dossier." Unfortunately for Mr. Blair, one cannot stand by the intelligence reports that said Saddam had an unconventional weapons systems that could be deployed within 45 minutes of his ordering it and at the same time express doubt that such weapons exist.
Saddam did not use these weapons, although a qualitatively superior military force was ready to invade his country, overthrow his government and plunder Iraq's wealth. In the weeks prior to the war, UN inspectors found nothing more than some missiles that flew a few miles too far under ideal flight conditions, but no biochemical warheads. In the weeks since the war, those searching for weapons on behalf of the invaders have failed to find any evidence of a biochemical arsenal. They have offered Saddam's lieutenants inducements to cooperate in finding weapons, but the only answer they get is that their is nothing for which to look. They can spin all they want, but the best explanation for all of this is that the weapons were destroyed some time prior to the war, as directed by UN resolutions dating from 1991. How many times must that be said?
The dispute as to whether Alastair Campbell, Blair's media director, ordered the intelligence "sexed up" remains a dispute with the BBC supporting its reporters and the government clearing Campbell. The same paraliamentary committee that cleared Campbell also said theat many of the claims made by the government in the dossier were inappropriate or exaggerated. In other words, if one wishes to use a colloquial term, the dossier was "sexed up."
The dossier was sexed up, whether by Campbell or somebody else. The question is: by whom and on whose orders? Did low-level intelligence agents conspire to start this war by presenting the government with a false assessment of Saddam's capabilities. That seems unlikely. The most likely hypotheses are those in which the politicians cherry-picked the intelligence, no matter how faulty, to support a course of action on which they had decided but was not justified on any grounds of international security. In other words, Blair lied and knew or should have known that he was lying.
Blair and his people can use whatever language they want. The fact remains that in order to drum up parliamentary support for the invasion, Blair presented a dossier that misrepresented the facts. That, not whether Alastair Campbell or somebody else is directly responsible for that misrepresentation, is what is most important.