Taleban defectors 'are rejoining insurgency'

[laststeamtrain]

Source: Times Online

From Times Online
April 22, 2010
Taleban defectors 'are rejoining insurgency'
Jerome Starkey, Kabul

Almost a quarter of the low-ranking Taleban commanders lured out of the insurgency in southern Afghanistan have rejoined the fight because of broken government promises and paltry rewards, a scathing report on reintegration claims.

Nato plans to spend more than $1 billion (£648 million) over the next five years tempting Taleban foot soldiers to lay down their arms.

But research by a Kabul-based thinktank warns that those efforts could make matters worse by swelling the ranks of the insurgency, exacerbating village level feuds and fuelling government corruption.

<snip>

Reports of millions of dollars available to lure these people out of the fight risks tempting more people to join the insurgency – albeit temporarily – to benefit. Meanwhile, loyal government supporters “may become resentful, even hostile, if they see resources being channelled to anti‐government groups”.

Read more: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7104508.ece

[marmar]

1. But you just wait until we start picking off Taliban No. 2s......

..... the whole organization will fall like a house of cards. :P

[dipsydoodle]

2. It's because they advertised for banana carriers

You must know the song : Come Mr Taliban carry me bananas daylight come and me wanna go home......

[Robb]

3. I read the white paper this morning.

It's far from "scathing." It's actually quite good, and makes more than a single point. Here's a link: http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/2010_AAN_Golden_Surrender.pdf

Executive summary and postscript for the focus-challenged:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  

Reintegration is more complex and difficult to accomplish than is commonly appreciated. There are significant obstacles, including lack of trust, insurgent cohesion, and revenge attacks on participants. There is also a dissonance between the economic incentives offered by reintegration and some of the powerful social, political, ideological, and personal factors that cause people to fight.
  
A well‐executed reintegration scheme could have positive social, economic, and stabilisation benefits – and thus reduce the force of the insurgency – but if mishandled, it could do the reverse. Without intelligent design, effective delivery, and political resolve it has the potential to exacerbate local security conditions, undermine high‐level talks, and even increase insurgent recruitment. It could also distract policy‐makers from action to tackle the root causes of the conflict. Reintegration addresses the symptoms of the disease, and not the disease itself. 

POSTSCRIPT 

As indicated above, this paper does not seek to reach firm conclusions about a policy that has not yet been clearly defined or implemented. It has sought to warn against assumptions about reintegration. A well-executed reintegration programme, linked to wider political outreach and reform of government, could have major social, economic, and stabilisation benefits, but there are considerable obstacles to its success and a range of possible unintended adverse implications. It is essential that any reintegration policy takes account of such risks, in both design and implementation, and effectively manages and mitigates them.
  
It is also essential that reintegration is seen in perspective. As with the Chieu Hoi programme in South Vietnam, it might well achieve ‘tactical’ successes, but do little to avert strategic failure. Perhaps the greatest risk is that the programme distracts policy‐makers from addressing the root causes of the conflict, especially predatory, exclusionary politics, and the abuse of power. This would be treating the symptoms while ignoring the cancer.
Into what kind of society are we asking insurgents to integrate? ‘Golden surrender’ holds little appeal for those who are not fighting for gold. Indeed, there would seem to be as much need for the social and political reintegration of government officials and other power‐holders into society, as there is for insurgents. If this happens – through fairer politics, better government, and stronger development – it may well be that reintegration starts to happen quietly of its own accord.
  

[laststeamtrain]

4. Thanks for the link. n/t.

:thumbsup:

[Crowman1979]

5. This whole give them money and take their word for it gimmick will always fail!

Which ever general thought of this idea should be fired.

[hayu_lol]

6. The only people who think the Afghans can be bought...

have never read a comprehensive history of the area and it's people. Go back...ummm...late 19th century and see what the Afghan response was to both the British Raj and Russia...both of whom were desperately attempting to get their 'camel noses' under the Afghan tentflap.

The world has changed...the Afghans have not. The single given for these people is that they hate foreigners.