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Syrian involvement in the Gulf War during 1991 provided an excellent opportunity to learn the lessons of a modern battlefield and highlighted the need to find an antidote to the use of air power. It was about this time that the decision to combat the threat posed by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) through the use of a massive missile assault was taken. It was accepted that it was highly unlikely that the Syrian Air Force (SAF) would ever, by itself, be able to seriously challenge Israeli air supremacy in the near future. While the Syrian military is still struggling to come to terms with its many disadvantages, including chronic lack of funding and technological backwardness, it has succeeded in finding a possible method of counter-balancing Israel's air power.
The Syrians believe that a massive and sustained missile assault against Israeli Air Fields will go some way to nullifying Israel's air supremacy, both by the destruction of aircraft and airfield infrastructure and by the widespread use of runway denial weapons. In addition, Syria has long felt intimidated by Israel's nuclear capability and sees its combined missile and WMD arsenal as the only possible and effective counterbalance, if circumstances were to deteriorate sharply during a major conflict.
The Syrian Missile Command is based in Aleppo and is known to control three mobile surface-to-surface missile brigades, each of which includes one battalion of FROG-7 SSM, one battalion of SS-21 Scarab SRBM and one battalion of SS-1 Scud-B missiles. Two of the three Scud Battalions moved south towards Damascus in July 2001, following at least one test launch of an improved Scud that landed close to Israel's northern border.
The capability provided by some 60 TEL (Transporter-Elevator-Launcher) vehicles with 190 SS-1 Scud-B missiles (range 300 km, payload 985 kg) has been significantly strengthened by the recent construction of hardened silos and a deep network of tunnels. At least fifteen such underground workings, built with North Korean and Chinese assistance, are being readied for some 1,000 Scud-C missiles (range 500 km, payload 500 kg) and an additional four tunnels have been built to house the longer range Scud-D missiles (range 700 km, payload 500 kg), which the Syrians have recently begun constructing with North Korean, Chinese and Iranian help.
This very large force of Scud-C/D missiles does not form part of the Corps structure or the missile brigades, they instead create a massive conventional first strike capability against the defenses on the Golan and Israel's main combat air bases. The tunnels will provide a considerable degree of defense against conventional bombing for both the missile storage and maintenance facilities and are linked to a large number of camouflaged launch facilities. The Syrians also have about 90 antiquated Russian-built Frog-7 missiles (range 70 km, payload 450 kg) and 210 of the more capable SS-21 Scarab missiles (range 120 km, payload 480 kg).
Syria has two large underground missile production facilities near Aleppo and Hamah; both were built with Iranian, North Korean and Chinese assistance, while Iran and Syria jointly produce SCUD-C/D, CBW agents and cooperate on other strategic programs. Syria is believed to be attempting to acquire Chinese MRBM technology in the form of the M-9 and may indeed have already acquired M-11 missile systems.
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http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm