http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7937013/site/newsweek/site/newsweek/<snip>
Pakistani Foreign Minister Khursheed Kasuri told reporters last week that he believed bin Laden has been on the run since the capture earlier this month of Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the latest culprit to be identified as Al Qaeda's "No. 3." But Schroen says that both the Pakistanis and the Bush administration have expressed too much confidence that al-Libbi's arrest could lead the hundreds of Special Forces, CIA, FBI and other counterterror officials in Pakistan and Afghanistan to the Qaeda chieftain.
There is no evidence that bin Laden's entourage reacted in panic to the al-Libbi news. According to two Taliban operatives interviewed by NEWSWEEK, whose accounts could not be independently verified, bin Laden has been safely ensconced in a secret, well-protected base along the northern Afghanistan-Pakistan border for more than a year. One source cites bin Laden's security guards, and another cites people in contact with them, as saying that most of the leader's meetings with even trusted aides take place outside the base. "The point is to keep everyone, even his most trusted people, confused as to his real whereabouts," says one of these Taliban officials, whose nom de guerre is Ali Khail. And al-Libbi's proximity to bin Laden was hyped, he says. (Khail, a mujahedin commander during the Soviet war who is now a Taliban propaganda and intel operative, claims to have contacts in bin Laden's camp.) A former senior Taliban intelligence officer who today remains part of the ousted fundamentalist regime's intelligence network concurs: "Libbi doesn't know that much to endanger the sheik
," he says.
Bin Laden's greatest protection now may be his growing legend, Schroen says. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf fears a horrific Islamist backlash if he publicly arrests the man seen in parts of South and Central Asia and the Middle East as an Islamic Robin Hood. By contrast, the Pakistani leader is willing to hand over lesser figures like al-Libbi, who was allegedly involved in two attempts on Musharraf's life but arouses no strong feelings among the Pakistani public. As evidence, Schroen says that it took the Pakistanis five months to act against al-Libbi after the Americans delivered intel on the whereabouts of a Qaeda suspect who could not, at the time, be specifically identified; Schroen believes the Pakistanis acted only after determining that the suspect was not bin Laden but a smaller fish. "We gave them the information on Libbi back in December," says Schroen, who has written a new book on his work with the CIA in Afghanistan. "They didn't want to do it." Pakistani officials deny this. "I reject that Pakistan stayed back on the intelligence for five months," says Pakistani military spokesman Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan. "The moment Pakistan got confirmed intelligence, Pakistan immediately acted."
Schroen says he believes it was only after "a lot of behind-the-scenes pot-sweetening"—including a promise of F-16s—that al-Libbi was captured in a frontier town. Then it was a "win-win for the Pakistanis," Schroen says. "They get a bad guy off the playing field and nobody in Pakistan knows who the hell he is." CIA spokeswoman Jennifer Millerwise said the agency had no comment on any of Schroen's views.
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Schroen and other intelligence officials believe that to do bin Laden in, Washington must first replenish the CIA and other forces drained by Iraq.