Reply #21: Response [View All]

[tinnypriv]

<< This is exactly the kind of mindless rigidity that's caused the situation in the first place. How myopic can anyone be? >>

To address the latter point: almost everyone, it seems. To quote an opponent of full withdrawal for full peace, it is "common belief" that:

"There is no chance of peace between Israel and Syria unless Israel retreats 'to the last grain of sand' as it did in Sinai." ¹

An accurate summary of standard opinion, repeated often in Israeli commentary.²

To address the former point: the "rigidity" is in terms of international law. Syria's right to sovereignty over the entire territory is indisputable. Perhaps some mutual arrangements to ensure demilitarisation of the border, stationing of a Mixed Armistice force (as in Egypt), peace agreements etc, could be arranged, though they would only be lawful in the context of the Golan being Syrian, up to the 1967 border. This is a fact, and no amount of rhetorical denunciation will make it otherwise.

As to the "cause" of the situation in the first place, that is quite complex. The main factor is of course Israeli aggression to conquer the heights, committed after a UN/US/USSR-brokered cease-fire came into effect during the war of 1967 (the theft taking place without the knowledge of the civilian government).³

Previous to that, Israeli encroachment and provocative actions designed to inflame the situation were largely responsible for Syrian-Israeli confrontation (80% of hostile "incidents", perhaps more, conceded in Israel).⁴

Given the above, it seems a bit of a stretch to claim that Syria's unwillingness to bargain back territory it owns to a state that has been responsible for aggression against it and numerous provocations is the sole reason that another generation is "doomed to war".

A different conclusion does follow from the available facts, namely that Israel is obligated to withdraw fully from the heights. Period. A peace treaty as a result would be a pre-condition incidentally, though not an unreasonable one in my opinion (and it seems the Syrian's may go further and normalise relations, a significant concession).

To sum up, if the former obligation is too much honesty, perhaps Israel can cede to the latter demand. Anything else would be a reward for aggression. If you disagree, you'd have to be prepared to see the underlying principles of that disagreement extended to Tiberias, Kuwait City etc. I hardly think you'd like the conclusions.

<< Don't put words in my mouth, buddy. I'm saying that the Syrians simply were not interested in peace and pretended they were. When given the opportunity of a lifetime they turned it down and damned another generation to bloodshed. Why? Because the al Assad folks have made a family business out of using Israel as a scapegoat for Syrians' woes. Peace with Israel means no scapegoat, and that's scary. >>

The only checkable fact you have in this paragraph is that the Syrians "turned down" an "opportunity of a lifetime". Given that you have not presented any evidence to support this statement (despite being asked), I can only conclude that an additional request for validation will only result in a repetition of the statement, sans evidence. I hardly see how that will advance the discussion (especially so since the one reference you gave refutes your own statement).

<< They are my words. >>

And you supplied this caveat: "don't take my word for it".

I took your advice, checked the document you gave, and commented on the fact it doesn't support your claim in the slightest. I'll conclude from your response that we are in agreement on this. To address your words (keeping in mind the lack of supporting evidence):

<< Syria refused to negotiate any solution that gave Israel even symbolic access to the Gallilee. >>

Or, in the proper historical context, the Syrians refused to "negotiate" away their own territory; territory taken by violence and held only by virtue that they have a gun visibly cocked in their direction.

<< That's idiocy. That's like Arafat saying that the Jews have no claim at all to the Temple Mount. If that's your negotiationg position, then you're not here to negotiate. >>

Since the analogy is ridiculous, I see no need to comment, but out of thoroughness I will explain the lack of parallel:

Israel has no sovereign claim to the territory of the Temple Mount, nor do "the Jews". It could even be said that perhaps the Palestinian Arabs don't either, though they could at least attempt an argument (perhaps a convincing one).

Of course the above has no bearing on the right of access, as enshrined in the relevant statues of law. The reason being that it is a completely different topic and totally irrelevant.

-----

1. Op-ed, Yosef Harif, Ma'ariv, 21 Jan 2004.

2. For one (minor) example, cf. David Fogel, op-ed, Ma'ariv, 6 Jan 2004:

"Finally there is someone else to annoy – the Syrians. So what if the Syrians want to return to the negotiation table? Perhaps it could, 'heaven forbid', bring peace. Just make sure we revert to type, and do something bloody-minded again, like build more settlements, plant more trees and open more kindergartens. And after there is another war and more bloodshed, only then will we return all the territories, as we returned everything to the Egyptians, Jordanians and Lebanese" (emphases added)

3. The aggression was conceded at the time, since Moshe Dayan admitted his plans were to "exploit" Israel's military advantage to capture the "maximal military lines", despite knowing that Syria was being instructed by Egypt to accept a cease-fire (which it did). Dayan, Quoted, Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p.248, and sources cited.

4. On Israel's "strategy of escalation on the Syrian front", see Avi Shlaim, ibid, p.235 and sources cited. See also Moshe Dayan's comments:

"I know how at least 80 percent of the clashes there started. In my opinion, more than 80 percent, but let's talk about 80 percent. It went this way: We would send a tractor to plow some area where it wasn't possible to do anything, in the demilitarised area, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn't shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance farther, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the air force also, and that's how it was" (ibid, cited from Yediot Aharonot, 27 April 1997)