The Great Security Delusion
In the wake of the Boston bombings, we are hearing all sorts of suggestions from folks trying to be helpful about how to "improve" security -- usually involving restricting use of something or instituting some new screening procedure. It is as if we believe that somewhere out there in the universe there is some perfect combination of security procedures, policies, surveillance and hyper-aggressive policing that will protect us from future attacks by committed terrorists, if only we could just discover it. So, after the 9-11 hijackers employ box cutters, a ban on bladed tools (such as screwdrivers) is put in place. And when one man tries unsuccessfully to ignite a shoe bomb on board an airplane, we institute a policy that has forced hundreds of millions of travelers to remove belts and shoes at airports. A foiled liquid bomb plot in London means half the contents of that lovely Clinique for Men skin care basket your sister gave you at Christmas gets seized at the airport. Thanks to an unsuccessful underwear bomber, those same travelers now get to endure either a virtual strip search or a humiliating pat down. In the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings, there is a current thread here on DU calling for removal of mailboxes and trash containers during public events.
Every one of these newly instituted policies rests on the same fundamental fallacy: i.e., that because terrorist X tried to do (or succeeded in doing) Y utilizing Z, the entire public's use of Z must be drastically curtailed or modified in order to keep us "safe" from a future attack of the same nature. The problem, of course, is that every one of these new policies and procedures is aimed at the LAST terrorist attack or attempt, and committed terrorists, intending not to get caught and always wanting to play on the element of surprise (a key ingredient in fostering terror), will always look for a method of carrying our their plans that is specifically designed to evade whatever mechanisms and procedures happen to be in force in any given place or time. And the simple, harsh truth of the matter, which many of us are unwilling to face, is that there is absolutely no way to plan for every contingency or prevent every plot. There is no security procedure or combination of procedures that can ultimately prevent a person intent on doing harm to others in a public setting from doing so. Sure, a few procedures might make sense -- there is no reason to make it easy to get a gun on board an airplane, for example, so metal detectors certainly make sense -- but beyond a few common-sense practices and procedures, this ever-escalating spiral of layer upon layer of security procedure accomplishes nothing more than creating a delusion of security. And while some of us might find comfort in that delusion, at a certain point all of these new procedures not only fail to enhance anybody's real security, but they become a colossal waste of resources as well.
I think there's a reason the Constitution makes no mention whatsoever of "public safety" or "public security." I think our founders understood well that the world is often a very dangerous place, and that in a society where we enjoy (relative) freedom of movement, there is necessarily an inherently greater relative risk that someone committed to doing us harm may, on occasion, succeed in doing so. Ben Franklin's famous quote points precisely to this trade-off: "Those who would purchase a little temporary safety by sacrificing essential liberty deserve neither safety nor liberty." Horrifying as these events certainly are when they occur, it is worth remembering that they remain exceedingly rare in this country. And in terms of probability, the likelihood that any particular individual will be injured in or die from one of these terrorist events remains a long way down the scale of probability from, say, getting struck by lightening.
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